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International agreements—treaties—are basic building blocks of  inter-
national law. Article  of  the Statute of  the International Court of  
 Howard M Holtzmann Professor of  International Law, Yale Law School. The author is 
indebted to Diane Haar, Lorraine Charlton, and Amanda Costikyan Jones for their contributions to 
the preparation of  this Article, and to Michael Reisman and Oona Hathaway for their critical com-
ments. Three anonymous readers also provided useful criticism, for which I wish to thank them.
 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, Art (a),  UNTS  (entered 
into force  January ) (hereinafter Vienna Convention), “treaty” means an international agree-
ment concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation’. Many different terms are used to refer to international agreements; for present pur-
poses, the differences are of  no importance and this Article will use the words ‘agreement’, ‘treaty’, 
and ‘convention’ interchangeably. See JAS Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, (eds),  The Major 
International Treaties of the Twentieth Century () : ‘Whether the treaty is called an “Alliance 
Treaty” or a “Declaration” makes no differ ence. Treaties have been called by many other names and 
each type of  treaty is usually cast in its own conventional form. Some of  the more common types of  
treaties are headed Convention, Acte Finale, Pact, Agreement, Protocol, Exchange of  Notes, Modus 
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Justice places them fi rst on the list of  international law sources, and 
 during the six decades since the Statute was adopted, treaty law has 
become ever more predominant. Considering the complexity of  con-
temporary legal problems, it is diffi cult to imagine the creation of  inter-
national law and international legal institutions without carefully 
negotiated, written, agreements. Changes in customary international 
law (the practice of  states) come slowly, and contemporary international 
law needs the most effi cient possible vehicles for modernization.
International human rights and humanitarian law—the main area of  
interest in this Article—is no exception; the rapid development of  the 
subject could only have taken place through written agreements. What is 
not suffi ciently appreciated, however, is the degree to which international 
human rights agreements depart from the traditional treaty form. 
International rights agreements are so different from traditional treaties 
that they might better be analyzed as a distinct jurisprudential phenom-
enon. The same is true of  many of  the other international instruments 
that the rights revolution has helped to inspire: international environ-
mental agreements, animal welfare agreements, and protection for the 
rights of  indigenous peoples, for example.
International treaties, traditionally, took a form analogous to  private 
law contracts: an exchange of  commitments to the reciprocal advantage 
of  the signing parties. Traditional treaty doctrine refl ected the reliance 
on the private contract analogy in important ways. Enforcement, trad-
itionally, was the responsibility of  the parties to the treaty; the only state 
with standing to retaliate against a breach was the one whose treaty rights 
Vivendi, or Understanding, as well as Treaty, with some prefi x such as alliance, boundary, etc.; and 
this list is not comprehensive.’ See also Restatement (Third) of  the Foreign Relations Law of  the 
US §, Comment (a) (‘Various designations of agreements. The terminology used for international 
agreements is varied. Among the terms used are: treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, covenant, 
charter, statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of  notes, agreed minute, memorandum of  
agreement, memorandum of  understanding, and modus vivendi. Whatever their designation, all 
agreements have the same legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of  their con-
clusion indicate otherwise’); Malcolm Shaw, International Law  (th edn, ) (the words ‘refer 
to the same basic activity and the use of  one term rather than another often signifi es little more than 
a desire for variety of  expression’).
 Statute of the International Court of Justice,  June ,  Stat , TS No ,  Bevans :
‘. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly rec-
ognized by the contesting states’.
 Compare JAS Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein,  The Major International Treaties of the 
Twentieth Century ()  (‘during the fi ve decades after the end of  the Second World War more 
treaties were signed than during the whole of  the previous four centuries’).
 See, eg United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS),  December ,  
ILM ; Antarctic Treaty ( Antarctic Treaty),  December ,  UNTS ; Kyoto 
Protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
 December , at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html>; General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature  October ,  Stat A,  UNTS .
 See text at nn – below.
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were violated. Responses to violations included self-help through 
 suspension of  performance or abrogation of  the agreement; to put the 
matter in contract terminology, obligations were conditional upon one 
another. These resemblances stem from the fact that treaties, like con-
tracts, were intended as reciprocal exchanges, of  mutual benefi t to the 
signing parties but of  little or no legal concern to the rest of  the world. 
Most modern treaties still take this form.
This exchange model of  treaty relationships, however, is not well suited 
to human rights agreements. Human rights treaties protect not the recip-
rocal interests of  other signatory states, but (more importantly) the rights 
of  non-parties (the individual rights holders). International legal doctrine 
refl ects this fact by making broad exceptions to the usual treaty rules. 
Rather than leaving enforcement to a single aggrieved state, the entire 
international community is charged with enforcement of  an obligation erga 
omnes. Moreover, retaliation in kind is a not a permitted response to a 
breach; it would only compound the injury to the treaties’ real benefi ciar-
ies. Put bluntly, the guiding principle is not ‘tit for tat’ but ‘two wrongs 
don’t make a right’. Human rights and humanitarian law agreements are 
not reciprocal exchanges of  conditional promises—contracts—but parallel 
and independent commitments to respect pre-existing moral norms—what 
this Article will call ‘pledges’. ‘Pledging’ now extends beyond its initial 
area of  application to other normative domains such as species preserva-
tion and environmental protection—indeed, to every subject matter where 
activists seek to use international law to further normative objectives.
The distinction between traditional treaties and pledges is not merely 
theoretical; it has important consequences for compliance. The central 
motivation for both private contract and traditional treaty compliance is 
that both parties have a stake in the continued vitality of  a mutually bene-
fi cial legal relationship. The most potent force for treaty compliance, in 
other words, is reciprocity; breach by one party means that the aggrieved 
state will deny it the benefi ts of  the treaty regime in response. The 
motivations are very different when human rights agreements are at 
issue. When human rights treaties are violated, retaliation in kind by 
other states is both self-defeating and impermissible under international 
law. A state that violates human rights knows that other states are 
unlikely to respond by violating the rights of  their own nationals, and 
probably has little concern whether other states might do so, in any 
event. Enforcement of  human rights agreements is therefore quite 
unlike enforcement of  other international agreements, and empirical 
studies have suggested that compliance has not been high. This is not 
to say that human rights agreements should not be thought entitled to 
 See text at n  below.  See text at nn – below.
 See text at nn – below.  See text at nn – below.
 See text at n  below.  See text at nn – below.
 See text at nn – below.    See text at nn – below.
 See text at nn – below.
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enforcement—they are—but rather that the usual mechanisms for enforce-
ment are, in practice, less effective than the enforcement mechanisms for 
traditional contractual treaties.
It is entirely unclear whether human rights conventions achieve any 
greater level of  respect and compliance than the underlying norms on 
which the conventions are grounded. It is unclear, in other words, 
whether anything is gained by taking a moral norm and embedding it in 
a legal instrument. This Article concludes with speculation about why 
rights activists struggle to obtain legal recognition for moral norms—
whether pledges, in other words, give added value. Answering this ques-
tion will require considerable additional empirical research and analysis.
I .  F ‘C ’   ‘P ’
Treaties are the way that states have traditionally expressed their volun-
tary assumption of  international legal commitments. When the inter-
national humanitarian and human rights law movements fi rst gained 
strength, therefore, it was natural for rights advocates to embody these 
newly recognized rights and obligations in treaties. Yet the analogy does 
not quite fi t; traditionally, treaties were founded on reciprocity—a ‘con-
tract’ model—while rights agreements are parallel, unilateral pledges to 
respect pre-existing moral principles. As the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights put it, a human rights agreement is not ‘a reciprocal 
exchange . . . for the mutual benefi t of  the contracting States’ but ‘a 
framework enabling States to make binding unilateral commitments’.
A. The Traditional Model: Treaty As Contract
The analogy between treaties and contracts has always seemed self- 
evident. Lord McNair observes, ‘[i]t is obvious that the treaty as a con-
cept of  international law has been mainly indebted in the course of  its 
development to the agreement or contract of  private law’.
 See text at nn – below.
 Asserts one introductory international law textbook, ‘[T]reaties [are] really not much different 
from citizens of  states in their contractual relationships’.
Christopher L Blakesley, Edwin B Firmage, Richard F Scott, and Sharon A Williams, The 
International Legal System: Cases and Materials (th edn, ) . The authors continue: ‘What makes 
treaties binding? By the same token, why are contracts in a domestic system binding? . . . In antiquity, 
religious solemnity provided the obligatory force for both contracts and treaties.’ 
Christopher L Blakesley, Edwin B Firmage, Richard F Scott, and Sharon A Williams, The 
International Legal System: Cases and Materials (th edn, ) . Compare Scott Barrett, 
Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making () : ‘A treaty is 
recognized as being legally binding on all its parties and only on its parties. Treaties are therefore 
analogous to contracts in domestic law. That is, treaties are unlike legislative acts. At the same time, 
treaties are not the same as contracts because contracts are written with the understanding that they 
will be enforced by a third party: the state.’
 McNair, The Law of Treaties () .
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[T]he legal identity of  treaties and contracts is almost universally assumed by 
writers upon International Law . . . [I]n matter of  form, it is undeniably true; 
the nearest approach in private law to the treaty in point of  form is the 
contract.
Oppenheim defi nes treaties as ‘conventions or contracts between two 
or more States concerning various matters of  interest’. Observes 
Niemeyer:
The axiom that contracts are binding obligations has become of  paramount 
importance for the whole of  international law, since it has been made the very 
foundation of  its obligatory force. Under the infl uence of  a school of  thought 
which essentially reduces international law to the tenet that agreements must be 
kept, public opinion in the whole world has become accustomed to consider as 
international law that which has been stipulated between states.
The analogy between treaties and contracts is in many respects a natural 
one. The experience of  drafting a treaty, for one thing, is like the experi-
ence of  drafting a contract. Those who negotiated the Louisiana Purchase 
or Russia’s sale of  Alaska to the United States would have had no diffi -
culty seeing the analogy, but these examples are hardly unique. Moreover, 
there are many contract law doctrines that have analogous provisions in 
treaty law. Both treaties and contracts can be invalidated for error or 
fraud; for coercion in obtaining assent; or for inconsistency with 
strongly held public values (‘jus cogens’, or peremptory norm, in the 
treaty context; ‘public policy’ in the contract context). Neither treaties 
nor contracts are binding on third parties without their consent, 
although (in both contexts) non-signatories can be made ‘third party 
benefi ciaries’. Treaty signatories, revealingly, are referred to as ‘con-
tracting states’. The most important similarity, of  course, is that both 
 McNair, The Law of Treaties () .
 Oppenheim,  International Law (rd edn, ) .
 Gerhart Niemeyer, Law without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law (nd edn, 
) .
 Louisiana Purchase Treaty,  April , US-Fr., at <http://www.archives.gov/exhibit_hall/
american_originals/louistxt.html>; Treaty Concerning the Cession of  the Russian Possessions in 
North America by his Majesty the Emperor of  all the Russias to the United States of  America,  
June , US-Rus., at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/russia/treatywi.htm>.
 McNair, The Law of Treaties () ; but see ibid. at  (noting various doctrinal differences).
 Vienna Convention, Arts –; see also Restatement (Second) of  Contracts (), §§ 
(mutual mistake),  (unilateral mistake),  (preventing formation of), and  (rendering 
 voidable).
 Vienna Convention, Art –; see also Restatement (Second) of  Contracts (), §§ 
(mutual mistake) and  (unilateral mistake).
 Vienna Convention, Art ; see also Restatement (Second) of  Contracts (), §.
 Vienna Convention, Art –; see also Restatement (Second) of  Contracts (), §.
 Vienna Convention, Art ; see also Restatement (Second) of  Contracts (), §.
 Vienna Convention, Art (f): ‘ “contracting State” means a State which has consented to be 
bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force.’ The Vienna Convention is not 
declaratory of  general pre-existing law in all respects, but the provisions cited in this paragraph and 
generally throughout this Article are among the least controversial.
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treaties and contracts are consensual, bilateral or multi-party, sources of  
legal obligation.
The contractual treaty model has proven enormously useful for dealing 
with a wide variety of  subject matters. There are peace treaties, land and 
maritime boundary treaties, treaties of  alliance, arms limitation agree-
ments, intellectual property conventions, agreements to refer disputes to 
arbitration or to the International Court of  Justice, and treaties creating 
regional organizations or free trade groupings. For as long as there have 
been international relations, there have been international agreements. 
So long as states have interests in common, one should expect them to 
continue institutionalizing their common interests in treaties.
B. Rights Agreements
International humanitarian and human rights agreements (the central 
focus of  this Article) are a relatively recent development. The historical 
antecedents were anti-slavery agreements. Rules of  armed combat 
(such as the Hague Regulations) and international humanitarian law 
(‘IHL’) followed thereafter, with the four Geneva Conventions being 
adopted just after the end of  the Second World War. Included among 
 See, eg Vienna Convention, Art (b): ‘ “ratifi cation”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” 
mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international 
plane its consent to be bound by a treaty’.
 One of  the earliest recorded peace treaties was between the Hittite and Egyptian empires after 
the Battle of  Kadesh (c  BC). After an extremely costly four-day battle in which neither side 
gained any signifi cant advantage, both sides claimed victory. A few hours later, resumption of  the 
battle (which neither side could afford) seemed imminent. A peace treaty was signed in two versions, 
one in Egyptian hieroglyphs and the other in Akkadianusing cuneiform; both versions survive to this 
day. Its provisions are far-reaching; they include a mutual assistance pact in the case of  attack from 
a third party; articles pertaining to repatriation of  refugees; and threats of  retribution if  the treaty is 
broken. The treaty is considered of  such importance in the fi eld of  international relations that a 
reproduction of  it hangs in the United Nations headquarters. See Encyclopedia: Peace treaty, at 
<http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Peace-treaty>.
 See, eg Berlin Act,  February  (dealing with termination of  the slave trade in Africa); 
General Act of  the Brussels Conference of  –; Convention of  Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 
; Slavery Convention,  September ,  LNTS ,  Stat.  (entered into force 
 March ).
 The laws of  warfare are dated, customarily, to the drafting of  the Lieber Code during the 
American Civil War. See generally Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of 
Humanity,  Colum J Transnat’l L () . More than  conventions regulating the conduct of  
warfare were adopted by the Hague Peace Conferences of   and . See Yoram Dinstein, 
Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law, in Theodor Meron, Human 
Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues ().
 The phrase ‘international humanitarian law’ is generally understood to include the four Geneva 
Conventions adopted in , together with the two Additional Protocols drafted in Geneva in . 
See generally Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law, 
in Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues (). This, obvi-
ously, was prior to the adoption of  most international human rights agreements. For a history of  the 
development of  international humanitarian law (‘IHL’), see P Boissier, History of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross: From Solferino to Tsushima ().
 Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in the Field, 
 August ,  UST ,  UNTS  [hereinafter Geneva I]; Convention for the Amelioration 
of  the Condition of  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  Armed Forces at Sea,  August 
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these so-called ‘jus in bello’ restrictions on conduct in armed confl ict were 
regulations protecting prisoners of  war; prohibitions on use of  bio-
logical, bacteriological or chemical weapons, poison, and certain types of  
bullets or projectiles; safeguards for enemy aliens resident in occupied 
territory (or otherwise falling into the hands of  the hostile power); and 
prohibitions on pillage or destruction of  cultural property.
The development of  international human rights law (‘IHR’) started 
even more recently, gathering momentum around the middle of  the last 
century. The process is still underway. There are conventions protect-
ing civil and political liberties; safeguarding the rights of  racial minor-
ities, women and children; and prohibiting torture and genocide, as well 
as numerous regional human rights agreements. Although the two 
 bodies of  law cannot be equated (there are important differences between 
them), this Article will refer to both IHL and IHR conventions, collect-
ively, as ‘rights agreements’.
Although the fact passed largely unremarked in the literature of  the 
time, it was probably apparent to the drafters of  these agreements that 
there was something jurisprudentially radical about the enterprise in 
which they were engaged. Rights agreements constituted a sharp  departure 
,  UNTS  [hereinafter Geneva II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  
War,  August ,  UNTS  [hereinafter Geneva III]; Convention Relative to the Protection 
of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War,  August ,  UNTS.  [hereinafter Geneva IV].
 Geneva III.
 See, eg Protocol for the Prohibition of  the Use in War of  Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of  Bacteriological Methods of  Warfare,  June ,  UST ,  LNTS  [here-
inafter Geneva Protocol]; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, .
 Geneva IV.
 Protocol Additional (No I) to the Geneva Conventions of   August , and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Confl icts,  June , Art ,  UNTS  [here-
inafter Protocol I].
 See also Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law, 
in Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues () : ‘To the 
extent that international humanitarian law . . . engender[s] human rights, it is interesting to note the 
dates when the central instruments were formulated. Whereas the development of  the international 
human rights of  peacetime began in earnest only after World War II, some fundamental freedoms 
of  wartime had a seminal existence even before World War I.’
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  December ,  UNTS ; 
International Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  Racial Discrimination,  March , 
 UNTS ; Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW),  December ,  ILM ; Convention on the Rights of  the Child,  November 
,  UNTS ; Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,  December ,  UNTS ; African Charter on Human Peoples’ 
Rights,  June ,  ILM  [hereinafter Banjul Charter]; American Declaration of  the Rights 
and Duties of  Man,  March– May , OAS Off  Rec OEA/Ser. L/V/I. Rev. (); American 
Convention on Human Rights,  November ,  UNTS ; European Convention for the 
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  November ,  UNTS .
 It would be an oversimplifi cation to say that one deals with treatment of  civilians in times of  
peace and the other with treatment of  both civilians and soldiers in times of  war; human rights exist 
in times of  war as much as times of  peace. However, the main thrust of  international humanitarian 
law is the legality of  conduct in times of  war, and human rights law is mainly concerned with rights 
that individuals have generally—both in times of  peace, as well is in times of  war.
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from the traditional contractual model. Rights agreements are not trad-
itional contracts of  accommodation—marriages of  convenience between 
states whose economic or security interests happen to overlap. The 
 distinctive characteristic of  rights agreements is that they are designed to 
affi rm the existence of, and pledge commitment to, a set of  pre-existing 
moral norms. Reciprocity is not the glue that holds a rights regime 
together; the glue that holds a rights regime together is shared commit-
ment to moral principle.
This characteristic is more pronounced with human rights agreements 
than with IHL agreements, where elements of  reciprocal advantage can 
still be found. In signing an agreement to respect the rights of  prisoners 
of  war, for example, a state may hope to receive better (reciprocal) treat-
ment of  its own soldiers, if  they are captured. The same is true with 
protections for enemy aliens; each state benefi ts reciprocally from the 
other’s better treatment of  its nationals.
Even this remnant of  reciprocal self-interest vanishes with human 
rights agreements, which focus on a state’s treatment of  its own nationals. 
Formalistically and superfi cially, states signing a human rights agreement 
are making reciprocal promises to one another not to engage in certain 
acts. But the reason for complying with one’s own obligations is not that 
one receives an advantage from the other state complying, as well. The 
other’s compliance in most cases confers no concrete advantage at all. 
 A somewhat similar distinction is sometimes made between ‘contractual’ and ‘legislative’ treat-
ies. See, eg McNair, The Law of Treaties () : We come now to an even more fundamental 
distinction, namely, that between treaties whose essential juridical character is that of  the Contract, 
and treaties whose essential juridical character is that of  Law-making of  Legislation. . . . Oppenheim 
is mainly responsible for familiarizing British and American writers with the conception. One the 
one hand we have the Vertrag or contract where the will of  one party is different from that of  the 
other, the contract (Vertrag) being here a means for achieving different and opposite ends. Thus 
while the purchaser promises to pay the money, the seller undertakes to deliver the goods. . . . On the 
other hand, (we have) the agreement (Vereinbarung) which serves the purpose of  realizing identical 
aims.’ What McNair and Oppenheim conceive as ‘legislative’ treaties resembles the notion of  a 
pledge, because both parties share a common aim and agree to do the same thing. The difference is 
that a legislative treaty need not embed a moral norm, which is an essential element of  a pledge. It 
is because of  the embedded moral norm that retaliation in kind is forbidden, which infl uences greatly 
the methods of  enforcement that are available. See text at nn – below.
 The foundations of  human rights is a highly controversial issue. The various explanations 
might include that human rights are universal moral rights; that they arise out of  customary inter-
national law; or that they are predominantly religious in derivation. Here, however, there is no need 
to resolve the ultimate grounding of  the rights in question. Although for convenience they will be 
referred to as embodying ‘moral’ rights, this is not meant to exclude other strongly held principles 
extrinsic to treaty law.
 This Article characterizes IHL as predominantly a pledge rather than a contract, nonetheless. 
First, many IHL provisions apply to civil wars, so that reciprocity cannot be the explanation. See, 
eg Geneva Conventions I–IV, Common Article ; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  
 August , and Relating to the Protection of  Victims of  Non-International Armed Confl icts, 
 June  [hereinafter Protocol II]. Moreover, IHL resembles human rights law in important doc-
trinal respects, such as the prohibition of  retaliation in kind and the obligations erga omnes. See text 
at n  (countermeasures for both human rights and humanitarian law); n  (obligation erga omnes 
for human rights); n  (obligation erga omnes) for Geneva Conventions.
 For protection of  prisoners of  war, see Geneva III.
 For protection of  enemy aliens, see Geneva IV.
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One complies with one’s obligations because of  their moral  grounding—in 
signing the pledge, a state thereby acknowledges its moral basis—and not 
because other states are doing so.
Human rights and humanitarian law agreements might be character-
ized as ‘morally declaratory’. A provision in an international agreement 
is said to be ‘declaratory’ if  it restates (declares) what customary law 
already holds. A provision in a human rights agreement, by analogy, can 
be characterized as ‘morally declaratory’ if  it restates (declares) what mor-
ality already requires. Although the norms enunciated in rights agree-
ments may not already have been acknowledged as legally binding (and 
they are thus not declaratory in the usual sense), they are treated by the 
agreement as already morally binding. Rights agreements codify and 
affi rm what the signatories already accept as morally compelling, and by 
signing them, states commit themselves to respect those norms as a 
 matter of  law. Thus our label: ‘pledge’.
The language of  rights agreements often makes plain that they are 
designed to codify pre-existing moral values. Consider, for example, the 
Preamble and opening Articles of  the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights:
The State Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter 
of  the United Nations, recognition of  the inherent dignity and of  the equal and 
inalienable rights of  all members of  the human family is the foundation of  free-
dom, justice and peace in the world . . .
Agree upon the following articles:
. All peoples have the right of  self-determination. By virtue of  that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.
The rhetoric has distinct moral overtones. The text refers to norms that 
predate the agreement itself  (peoples’ right to freely determine their 
 political status, for example, and the values of  inherent dignity, equality, 
 See, eg Merriam-Webster Legal Dictionary: ‘Declaratory: adj. Serving to declare, set forth, or 
explain, as () Declaring what is the existing law’.
 It should be noted here that rights agreements often contain material that is not of  itself  an 
embodiment of  a moral right, but instead makes provision for ancillary arrangements (eg obligations 
to extradite or prosecute, creation of  reporting requirements). Although these are not themselves 
moral rights, the skepticism expressed here concerning state willingness to enforce them still applies; 
given that their ultimate goal is respect for moral norms rather than reciprocity.
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (preamble),  December ,  
UNTS  (entered into force  March ) [hereinafter ICCPR].
 Comparable text can be found in the The Declaration of Independence (US ): ‘We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of  Happiness. 
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of  the governed, That whenever any Form of  Government becomes destructive of  these 
ends, it is the Right of  the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying 
its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.’
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and inalienable rights). In becoming parties to the ICCPR, the signator-
ies commit themselves to the principle that all people already have these 
rights, and the remainder of  the text expresses ways in which the signa-
tories pledge to further these pre-existing moral values. Many other 
human rights agreements display a similar rhetorical style, essentially 
affi rming and codifying moral norms that exist independently of  the 
agreement itself.
C. ‘A Framework Enabling States to Make Binding 
Unilateral Commitments’
Academic writers have noted, on occasion, the difference between trad-
itional contractual agreements and human rights conventions:
Although reciprocity is a fundamental principle of  international law that gov-
erns treaty relations between states, it does not form the foundation for human 
rights treaties. These conventions do not represent agreements among states, but 
often amount instead to unilateral declarations by governments that they are willing 
to abide by international norms in their dealings with their own citizens . . . As a 
result the mechanism of  reciprocity is not a direct factor in the implementation 
of  such treaties.
 See, eg International Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  Racial Discrimination, 
(preamble),  March ,  UNTS : ‘Considering that all human beings are equal before the 
law and are entitled to equal protection of  the law against any discrimination and against any incite-
ment to discrimination,
. . .
Convinced that any doctrine of  superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifi cally false, 
morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and there is no justifi cation for racial discrim-
ination, in theory or in practice, anywhere, 
. . . .
Convinced that the existence of  racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of  any human 
society’; ‘Convention on the Rights of  the Child, November  , (preamble),  UNTS. : 
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of  society and the natural environment for the 
growth and well-being of  all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary 
protection and assistance so that it can assume its responsibilities within the community, 
Recognizing that the child, for full and harmonious development of  his or her personality, should 
grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of  happiness, love and understanding, 
Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought 
up in the spirit of  the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of  the United Nations, and in particular in 
the spirit of  peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity.
 Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 
() of the Vienna Convention,  Berkeley J Int’l L  ()  (emphasis added); see also Dinah 
Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (nd edn, )  (human rights agreements 
are different because not based on reciprocity); Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: 
International Humanitarian Law, in Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal 
and Policy Issues () – (international humanitarian law is different because reprisals not 
allowed); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?,  Yale LJ () , 
 (human rights agreements have different incentives for compliance because of  lack of  reci-
procity); Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () – 
(‘Conceptually, countermeasures are based on the principle of  interstate reciprocity, which, generally 
speaking, is foreign to human rights’); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and 
Functions,  Recueil des Cours D’Academie de Droit International ()  at  (‘the principal 
element of  horizontal deterrence is missing . . . [T]he threat that “if  you violate the human rights of  
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More frequent acknowledgements can be found, however, in the case law 
of  the bodies charged with enforcing the rights in question.
The ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee has stated that human rights 
treaties ‘are not a web of  inter-State exchanges of  mutual obligations’ and 
that the ‘principle of  inter-State reciprocity has no place’ in human 
rights. Addressing the question of  reservations to human rights treaties, 
the International Court of  Justice wrote, ‘one cannot speak of  individual 
advantages or disadvantages to states, or of  the maintenance of  a perfect 
contractual balance between rights and duties’.
The Inter-American Court of  Human Rights has observed, in greater 
detail, how little human rights instruments resemble traditional-type 
treaties ‘concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of  rights for 
the mutual benefi t of  the contracting States’:
Modern human rights treaties in general . . . are not multilateral treaties of the trad-
itional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual 
benefi t of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of  the 
basic rights of  individual human beings, irrespective of  their nationality, both 
against the State of  their nationality and all other contract States. In concluding 
these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a 
legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, 
not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their 
jurisdiction.
The Court continued, ‘the [American] Convention must be seen for what 
in reality it is: a multilateral legal instrument or framework enabling 
States to make binding unilateral commitments not to violate the human 
rights of  individuals within their jurisdiction’. In Ivcher v Peru, the 
Court confi rmed this holding and cited opinions of  the International 
Court of  Justice and the European Commission and Court of  Human 
Rights in support.
your inhabitants, we will violate the human rights of  our inhabitants” hardly serves as a 
deterrent’).
 ICCPR Human Rights Comm., General Comment (), d Sess., d mtg. at , UN 
Doc CCPR/C//Rev./Add. ().
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, 
 ICJ , .
 The Effect of  Reservations on the Entry into Force of  the ACHR (Arts  and ),  Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R., ser. A (),  HRLJ , para .
 ibid.
 ibid para . The Human Rights Committee has described the object and purpose of  the 
ICCPR similarly: ‘The object and purpose of  the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for 
human rights by defi ning certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of  obliga-
tions which are legally binding for those States which ratify.’ See ICCPR Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment (), d Sess., d mtg. at , UN Doc CCPR/C//Rev./Add. ().
 Ivcher v Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,  BHRC  (), p –, para –: ‘The convention 
and the other human rights treaties are inspired by a set of  higher common values (centered around 
the protection of  the human person), are endowed with specifi c supervisory mechanisms, are applied 
as a collective guarantee, embody essentially objective obligations, and have a special character that 
sets them apart from other treaties . . .  That fi nding [of  the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, 
at nn –] is consistent with the case law of  other international jurisdictional bodies. For example, 
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D. The Growth of  Pledging
Over the last fi ve decades, this strategy—using international agreements 
as pledges of  support for moral values—has spread to other substantive 
domains. Once the trend was underway, advocacy groups clamored for 
analogous agreements promoting their own normative agendas. As with 
rights agreements, the purpose of  these conventions is to ensconce moral 
values in treaties that, while superfi cially reciprocal, are unilateral in 
underlying structure.
One issue area where the strategy has been frequently employed is that 
of  human and natural heritage. The preamble of  the World Heritage 
Convention, a treaty which seeks to protect sites of  scientifi c, aesthetic, or 
conservational value, makes the Convention’s normative agenda clear:
Considering that deterioration or disappearance of  any item of  the cultural or 
natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of  the heritage of  all the 
nations of  the world’.
Considering that parts of  the cultural or natural heritage are of  outstanding 
interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of  the world heritage of  man-
kind as a whole’.
Other ‘heritage’ conventions include agreements on underwater cultural 
heritage, intangible cultural heritage, and minority group heritage, as 
well as the more prosaic natural, archaeological, historical, and artistic 
heritage.
in its advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide ()  ILR  at , 
the International Court of  Justice held that with treaties of  this nature: ‘the contracting States do not 
have any interests of  their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accom-
plishment of those high purposes of the raison d’être of the convention’. For their part, the European 
Commission and Court of  Human Rights have arrived at similar fi ndings. In Austria v Italy () 
YB of  the ECHR , the European Commission declared that the obligations undertaken by the 
states parties to the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
 (the European Convention) (Rome,  November ; TS  (); Cmd ): ‘are essen-
tially objective in nature, and intended to protect the fundamental rights of  human beings against 
violations on the part of  the High Contracting Parties, rather than to create subjective and reciprocal 
rights between the High Contracting Parties’. Similarly, in Ireland v UK ()  EHRR  (para 
) the European Court held the following: ‘Unlike international treaties of  the classic kind, the 
Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It cre-
ates, over and above a network of  mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the 
words of  the Preamble, benefi t from a “collective enforcement”.’ In Soering v UK ()  EHRR 
 (para ), the European Court declared that in interpreting the European Convention: ‘regard 
must be had to its special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. . . . Thus, the object and purpose of  the Convention as an instrument for the 
protection of  individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to 
make its safeguards practical and effective.
 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of  the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
 November ,  UNTS  [hereinafter World Heritage Convention]. The Convention 
states that ‘existing international conventions, recommendations and resolutions concerning cultural 
and natural property demonstrate the importance, for all the peoples of  the world, of  safeguarding 
this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it may belong’.
 International Convention for the Safeguarding of  the Intangible Cultural Heritage,  
October , at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images///e.pdf>; Buenos Aires 
Convention on the Protection of  the Underwater Cultural Heritage, adopted  November , 
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Wildlife and the environment have also been frequent benefi ciaries of  
this trend. Thus, for example, in the preamble to the  Convention 
on Wetlands of  International Importance, Especially Waterfowl Habitat 
(the ‘Ramsar Convention’), the contracting parties ‘recognize[d] the 
interdependence of  Man and his environment’ and affi rmed their con-
viction ‘that wetlands constitute a resource of  great economic, cultural, 
scientifi c, and recreational value, the loss of  which would be irreparable’. 
Similarly, the preamble to the Convention on the Conservation of  
Migratory Species of  Wild Animals explains that the contracting 
 parties:
[R]ecognizing that wild animals in their innumerable forms are an irreplaceable 
part of  the earth’s natural system which must be conserved for the good of  man-
kind [and] aware that each generation of  man holds the resources of  the earth for 
future generations and has an obligation to ensure that this legacy is conserved 
and, where utilized, is used wisely.
Some of  these agreements encompass norms on a variety of  topics. For 
example, Agenda  laid down moral obligations relating to (among 
other things) the protection of  human health, sustainable human settle-
ment development, the fi ght against poverty, forest conservation, con-
servation of  biological diversity, and respect for indigenous knowledge 
and cultures.
at <http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/underwater/html_eng/convention.shtml>; European Con-
vention on the Protection of  the Archaeological Heritage (Revised), opened for signature  January 
, CETS ; European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, opened for signature 
 November , CETS ; Convention on the Protection of  the Archeological, Historical, and 
Artistic Heritage of  the American Nations,  June ,  ILM ; World Heritage Convention; 
European Cultural Convention, opened for signature  May , CETS .
 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development,  September , at <http://www.
unhabitat.org/wssd/joburgdec.asp> (visited  June ); Convention on Biological Diversity, 
– June , at <http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp> (visited  June ); Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development,  June ,  ILM  [hereinafter Rio 
Convention]; Agenda , UN Doc A/CONF. / (); Nonlegally Binding Authoritative 
Statement of  Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of  all Types of  Forests, UN Doc A/CONF. /, v. (); Convention on the 
Conservation of  Migratory Species of  Wild Animals,  June ,  MISC , at  [here-
inafter Bonn Convention]; Convention for the Conservation of  Antarctic Seals,  ILM , 
 March ; Convention on Wetlands of  International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat,  February ,  UNTS , at – [hereinafter Ramsar Convention]; 
Agreement on the Conservation of  Polar Bears,  November ,  ILM ; African 
Convention on the Conservation of  Nature and Natural Resources,  September ,  
UNTS ; International Convention for the Protection of  Birds,  January ,  UNTS ; 
International Convention for the Regulation of  Whaling,  December ,  UNTS ; 
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,  May 
, O.A.S. . 
 Ramsar Convention.
 Bonn Convention.
 Agenda , UN Doc A/CONF. / (). The United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in June , also referred to as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, and attended by over  countries and  heads of  state, resulted in the creation 
of  several guiding environmental documents, including Agenda . 
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Among the more ambitious draft agreements are those concerning the 
transplantation of  tissues and organs, the right to adequate housing, 
the minimum allowable age for employment, use of  biological resources 
and genetic information, regulation of  adoption, the health and well-
being of  animals used for science, use and ownership of  fi rearms, 
industrial accident prevention, and delivery of  express mail. There 
are conventions about preventing violence at football matches and con-
ventions promoting the social well-being of  farmers. The European 
Convention for the Protection of  Pet Animals recognizes ‘that man has a 
moral obligation to respect all living creatures and . . . that pet animals 
have a special relationship with man’. It imposes a variety of  duties, 
including prohibiting the unsupervised acquisition of  animals by chil-
dren under , preventing unplanned pet reproduction, and disallowing 
the dispensing of  animals as gifts or prizes. Another convention dealing 
specifi cally with animal transport requires that, with the exception of  
reptiles, all domestic animals ‘likely to give birth during carriage or 
 having given birth during the preceding  hours shall not be considered 
fi t for transportation’.
Drafting of  such legal instruments is no longer the exclusive province 
of  offi cial governmental, international, or transnational bodies such as 
the Council of  Europe, the International Committee of  the Red Cross, 
or the United Nations. Private groups or even individuals with normative 
agendas can draft their own and offer them for international signature. 
 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation 
of  Organs and Tissues of  Human Origin,  January , CETS .
 Draft International Convention on Housing Rights, at <http://action.web.ca/home/housing 
resources.html?×=>.
 Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,  June , ILO .
 Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Dignity of  the Human Being with Regard 
to the Application of  Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, opened 
for signature  April , CETS ; Ad Hoc Committee on an International Convention Against 
the Reproductive Cloning of  Human Beings, at <http://www.un.org/law/cloning/>.
 European Convention on the Adoption of  Children, opened for signature  April , CETS 
.
 European Convention for the Protection of  Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and 
Other Scientifi c Purposes, opened for signature  March , CETS .
 European Convention on the Control of  the Acquisition and Possession of  Firearms by 
Individuals, opened for signature  June , CETS .
 Prevention of  Major Industrial Accidents Convention,  January , ILO C.
 Express Mail Agreement, – July , US-Mozam., Hein’s No. KAV , Temp. State 
Dep’t No. –, at .
 European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in 
Particular at Football Matches,  August , CETS .
 European Convention on the Social Protection of  Farmers,  May , CETS .
 European Convention for the Protection of  Pet Animals,  November , CETS .
 ibid.
 European Convention for the Protection of  Animals during International Transport,  
December , CETS .
 See, eg Universal Declaration of  Animal Rights, at <http://www.uncaged.co.uk/declarat.htm> 
(visited  June ); Freedom  Alternative to Agenda , at <http://www.freedom.org/ 
alternative> (visited June , ); Citizens’ Alternative Treaty to the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments, at <http://www.greens.org/s-r//-.html> (visited  June ); Earth Charter, 
03-Bybil-77_Chap03.indd   176 7/7/2007   3:59:27 PM
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS 
Undeniably, treaty-drafting is a growth industry; most of  the conven-
tions mentioned above have garnered enough state support to have gone 
into force. The ‘rights paradigm’, one might say, has revolutionized 
international jurisprudence. Another way to characterize the revolution, 
however, is to say that ‘pledging’ has taken its place as a recognizable new 
form of  international agreement.
II .  R  A:  E  R?
How wide a gap really exists between agreements of  mutual advantage 
and pledges to respect pre-existing moral norms? Has general treaty law 
simply expanded at the margin, to provide for treaties on newly import-
ant topics? Or has the last half-century witnessed the creation of  an 
innovative jurisprudential form? The latter is closer than the former to 
the truth.
What is distinctive about pledges is that the expectation of  perform-
ance by other signatories is no longer the only—or indeed the most 
important—reason for compliance. The strongest reason for a state to 
comply (or to urge compliance by other states) is that it agrees with the 
values that the treaty embodies. Compliance is grounded on recognition 
of  the underlying pre-existing norm as morally binding, and not on 
reciprocal self-interest. Taking a pledge is an act of  commitment to do 
the right thing, and this commitment’s force does not depend on what 
other states do.
This distinction has had at least two important doctrinal consequences 
for rights agreements. The fi rst is the rejection of  the traditional doctrine 
that the proper party to complain of  a violation is the treaty signatory 
that was directly affected (or whose nationals were directly affected). 
This traditional reciprocity-based notion is clearly unworkable for rights 
agreements, where there is likely not to be any directly aggrieved treaty 
at <http://www.earthcharter.org/fi les/charter/charter.pdf> (visited  June ); International 
Convention for the Protection of  Animals, at <http://www.animallaw.info/treaties/itconfprotanimal.
htm> (visited  June ). In addition to these treaties which are drafted with the intention of  
acquiring signatures by international governments, non-governmental organizations have also 
 created similar treaties intended for signature by other non-governmental organizations. See, eg, 
NGO Alternative Treaties, at <http://habitat.igc.org/treaties/> (last modifi ed  November ).
The Human Bioethics Treaty Organization, a non-profi t organization incorporated in Delaware and 
composed of  an array of  international representatives, describes its purpose as drafting treaties to 
oppose abortion, human cloning, and the death penalty. This organization employs the familiar 
moral rhetoric in its constitutional charter, declaring its representatives ‘determined to safeguard the 
legitimate freedom, common heritage, ethical values and treasured traditions of  their peoples, 
founded on the principles of  the rule of  law’ and ‘seeking to promote the moral stability as well as 
the social, economic and spiritual development of  their nations’. Human Bioethics Treaty Organization: 
HBTO Overview, at <http://www.hbto.org/hbto/overview.asp> (visited  June ).
 Of  the treaties listed above, the only ones that are not in force are: Universal Declaration of  
Animal Rights; Freedom  Alternative to Agenda ; Citizens’ Alternative Treaty to the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investments; Earth Charter; International Convention for the Protection 
of  Animals; and International Convention on Housing Rights.
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signatory and, in any event, the objective is not protection of  mutual 
advantage. The second important doctrinal innovation is that each signa-
tory is expected to continue to observe its pledge despite non-compliance 
by others. Compliance is predicated on states’ parallel and unconditional 
moral commitments, which are not affected by another signatory’s 
breach. Both of  these doctrinal innovations are substantially out of  step 
with the traditional ‘contractual’ assumption of  reciprocal advantage.
A. From ‘Reciprocal Advantage’ to Obligations Erga Omnes
The intended benefi ciaries of  rights agreements, quite clearly, are indi-
viduals and not the signatory states themselves. In particular, in the 
case of  human rights agreements, it is the interests of  the state’s own 
nationals that are at stake. States therefore have no direct practical stake 
in one another’s compliance:
[I]t is somewhat questionable whether there are substantial mutual benefi ts from 
greater respect for human rights across countries . . . As Moravcsik . . . has put it: 
‘Unlike international institutions governing trade, monetary, environmental or 
security policy, international human rights institutions are not designed primar-
ily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across 
 borders, but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities’.
While in some cases there may be international spillover effects from 
rights violations, this typically is not the case, and rights agreements are 
not for that reason any less binding. The existence of  a violation does not 
turn on whether externalities, in fact, occur.
The question of  negative externalities is important because, as a mat-
ter of  general treaty law, a state has diplomatic standing to protest a 
 violation only if  it has a direct interest. Either it, or one of  its nationals, 
must have been injured. This traditional doctrine that the state whose 
nationals have suffered from a violation is the one with standing to pro-
test is unworkable for rights agreements; it defeats the whole purpose of  
 The reference, here, is to human rights and international humanitarian law treaties. However, 
the pledge model (as noted above) has also been adopted by other sorts of  agreements, such as envir-
onmental or species protection. A pledge not to destroy habitat or hunt endangered species would be 
for the benefi t of  the species, not individual human beings.
 Eric Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human 
Rights?’,  J Confl ict Resolution  (forthcoming ), most recent version available at <http://
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/
Humanrightsarticle.pdf>, at –, citing Stephen Krasner, ‘Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human 
Rights, in Regime Theory and International Relations (Volker Rittberger (ed), ()) –, and 
Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of  Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe,  International Organizations () –.
 See generally Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (th edn, ) ,  
(citing Nottebohm [] ICJ Rep ): ‘[D]iplomatic protection . . . rests primarily on the existence 
of  the nationality of  the claimant state attaching to the individual or corporation concerned both at 
the time of  the alleged breach of  duty and at the time when the claim is  presented . . . It is trite 
learning that, with some exceptions, states may only exercise diplomatic protection in respect of  
their nationals.’
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the agreement, namely, to protect individuals from abuses by their own 
states. Rights agreements would be empty shells if  the so-called ‘domes-
tic jurisdiction’ defense—that human rights violations are exclusively the 
concern of  the violating state—were still accepted. For purposes of  inter-
national human rights and international humanitarian law, this ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’ argument has accordingly been rejected.
Academic commentators have recognized the connection between this 
question of  diplomatic standing to protest and the contractual approach 
to treaty obligations:
The nature of  human rights obligations is different from that of  most other 
rights and duties in international law. Treaty and customary obligations generally 
are reciprocal or contractual in nature. Treaty partners confer equal benefi ts on 
each other and accept equal duties in return. In consequence, most acts in breach 
of a treaty cause direct and usually immediate injury to the interests of another 
state. The state committing the wrongful act incurs state responsibility and the 
duty to make reparations for the harm caused. In contrast, human rights obliga-
tions have ‘the purpose of  guaranteeing the enjoyment of  individual human 
beings of  those rights and freedoms rather than to establish reciprocal relations 
between States’.
The doctrine that has replaced the restrictive traditional view of  diplo-
matic standing is that of  ‘obligations erga omnes’—obligations extending 
to all states.
 See generally Henkin, ‘Human Rights and “Domestic Jurisdiction’, in (Thomas Buergenthal 
(ed.) Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord (); Thomas Buergenthal, 
‘Domestic Jurisdiction, Intervention and Human Rights’, in P Brown and D MacLean (eds), Human 
Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy () . In regard to the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ argument, human 
rights and the laws of  war are somewhat different. International humanitarian law is largely con-
cerned with the conduct of  interstate war; offences against another state’s soldiers are not susceptible 
to the defence that they are within the state’s ‘domestic jurisdiction’. It should be kept in mind, how-
ever, that IHL also makes important provision for protection of  civilians in civil wars and rebellions. 
Yoram Dinstein, ‘Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law’, in Theodor 
Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues () –,  (recognizing 
that general focus is on interstate wars, but citing provisions of  the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols applying to internal armed confl ict).
 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (nd edn )  (emphasis 
added), quoting Other Treaties Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of  the Court (Art  ACHR), 
()  Inter-Am.Ct Hum.Rts, (ser. A), ()  HRLJ . See also Francesco Parisi and 
Catherine Sevcenko, ‘Treaty Reservations and the Economics of  Article () of  the Vienna 
Convention’,  Berkeley J Int’l L ,  (): ‘These conventions do not represent agreements 
among states, but often amount instead to unilateral declarations by governments that they are will-
ing to abide by international norms in their dealings with their own citizens. A human rights treaty 
often nets the signing state little in concrete benefi ts. It is instead an assumption of  obligations for 
purposes of  prestige. As a result, the mechanism of  reciprocity is not a direct factor in the imple-
mentation of  such treaties.’ 
 The doctrine of  obligations erga omnes is commonly attributed to Barcelona Traction, although 
its historical roots are said to go much deeper. See, eg, Theodor Meron, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () : ‘The concept of  customary obligations erga 
omnes, which dates back at least to the Hugo Grotius’ discussion () of  humanitarian interven-
tion, became prominent in the nineteenth century in the context of  protection of  minorities.’
In Barcelona Traction the International Court of  Justice declared, ‘all States can be held to have 
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes’ [] ICJ Rep .
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The doctrine of  obligations erga omnes is a corollary of  the  abandonment 
of  the contractual reciprocity model of  treaties, which sees reciprocal 
advantage to other state parties as the core rationale underlying inter-
national agreements. For rights agreements (in contrast to traditional 
contractual treaties) there is likely to be no state with a direct interest. To 
the extent that compliance provides benefi ts to other states (or non-
compliance causes injuries), these tend to be intangible and diffused 
across the international community as a whole. The entire international 
community is therefore equally responsible for ensuring compliance, 
regardless of  injury or benefi t.
The doctrine of  obligations erga omnes—that all states have standing to 
protest violations of  rights agreements—has been endorsed by the 
Restatement (Third) of  Foreign Relations Law. Section () of  the 
Restatement provides, ‘Any state may pursue international remedies 
against any other state for a violation of  the customary international law 
of  human rights’. The International Law Commission concurs. Certain 
human rights/international humanitarian law agreements explicitly recog-
nize that it is the responsibility of  all states parties to protest violations, 
regardless of  whether they have experienced any tangible injury.
B. The Right of  Retaliation in Kind
A second distinctive characteristic of  rights agreements concerns the 
type of  permissible remedies following a violation. For traditional agree-
ments of  a contractual sort, materially aggrieved states are generally 
entitled to retaliate by suspending their own compliance or by rescinding 
the agreement in its totality. In the case of  human rights agreements, 
 The Reporters’ Note elaborates: ‘The customary law of  human rights . . . protects individuals 
subject to each state’s jurisdiction, and the international obligation runs equally to all other states, 
with no state a victim of the violation more than any other. Any state, therefore, may make a claim 
against the violating state.’ Reporters’ Note  to Sec. () (emphasis added). See also Reporters’ 
Note : ‘Remedies available to states parties under international human rights agreements . . . and 
remedies available to all states for violation by any state of  the customary law of  human rights . . . do 
not depend on the nationality of  the individual victim.’
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with commentaries (, published by UN ), at Art , Commentary, paras 
, . Art  is based on the idea that in case of  breaches of  specifi c obligations protecting the collect-
ive interests of  a group of  States or the interests of  the international community as a whole, respon-
sibility may be invoked by States which are not themselves injured in the sense of  Art .
 The Common Art  to the Geneva Conventions, for example, recognizes the obligations of  all 
states to ensure the enforcement of  its provisions: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.’ Theodor Meron, 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () : ‘Common Article  of  the 
Geneva Conventions is an important conceptual precursor of  the principle of  obligations erga 
omnes . . . Article  clearly provides every state party with the authority to make representations 
before a wrongdoing state to bring it back into a position of  compliance with the Convention.’ The 
doctrine of  obligations erga omnes, however—with its rejection of  reciprocal advantage as the basis 
for human rights enforcement—applies even in the absence of  such explicit provision.
 There are occasional instances where other sorts of  norms are considered so important that ‘tit 
for tat’ behaviour is excluded (eg diplomatic protection). See, eg, International Law Commission, 
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this is not the case. The pledges that states make to protect human and 
humanitarian rights are independent and parallel, not conditional and 
reciprocal, so that non-performance by one party does not excuse non-
performance by another.
The traditional doctrine of  right of  retaliation in kind for breach of  
treaty fl ows directly from the analogy to contract law and from the prin-
ciple of  reciprocity of  obligation. In private contract law, obligations 
are usually conditional, such that failure of  performance on one side 
excuses a failure of  performance on the other. One introductory inter-
national law casebook reasons as follows:
Similarities to the private law of contracts. Neither parties to private contracts 
nor states parties to treaties are disposed to carry out their obligations if  the 
other side has not lived up to its undertaking or has made it clear that it does not 
intend to perform. There are public international public [sic] law parallels to 
failure of  consideration in the common law world, or failure of  cause in the civil-
ian world. There are parallels to prior breach of  condition precedent, material 
breach, anticipatory breach, frustration of  expectations, and the like.
Article () of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties codifi es 
this general principle of  treaty law:
A material breach of  a bilateral treaty by one of  the parties entitles the other to 
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its oper-
ation in whole or in part.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries 
(, published by UN ), at Article : ‘Obligations not affected by countermeasures
. . . . . A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfi lling its obligations:
. . . . (b) To respect the inviolability of  diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and docu-
ments’.
The restriction on retaliation in kind is based on the strong normative commitment of  the inter-
national community, even though the underlying norm is strictly speaking not a moral norm.
 The International Law Commission states that the traditional rule for treaties in general as 
follows: ‘The great majority of  jurists recognize that a violation of  a treaty by one party may give 
rise to a right in the other party to abrogate the treaty or to suspend the performance of  its own 
obligations under the treaty’.
International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries’, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, , vol II, at Art , Commentary (). The claim 
that ‘the great majority of  jurists’ hold this view is widely supported. See, eg, Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (th edn, )  (emphasis added): ‘It is widely recognized 
that material breach by one party entitles the other party or parties to a treaty to invoke the breach 
as the ground of  termination or suspension. This option by the wronged party is accepted as a sanc-
tion for securing the observance of  treaties.’
 Restatement (Second) of  Contracts (), §§– (effect of  failure to offer or give perform-
ance); § (anticipatory repudiation).
 Christopher L Blakesley, Edwin B Firmage, Richard F Scott, and Sharon A Williams, The 
International Legal System: Cases and Materials (th edn, ) .
 Vienna Convention, Art (). Art () concerns ‘a material breach of  a multilateral treaty by 
one of  the parties’. According to subparagraph (a), the other parties may by unanimous agreement 
suspend the operation of  the treaty in whole or in part. Subparagraph (b) provides: ‘[A] party spe-
cially affected by the breach [may] invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of  the treaty 
in whole or in part in the relations between itself  and the defaulting State.’ Vienna Convention, 
Art ()(b).
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For rights agreements, the rule is directly contrary. Some humanitarian 
conventions say so in as many words. More generally, Article () of  
the Vienna Convention exempts rights agreements from Article ()’s 
general rule, providing that retaliation in kind is not permissible as to 
protections of  the rights of  individuals:
Paragraphs  to  do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of  the 
human person contained in treaties of  a humanitarian character, in particular to 
provisions prohibiting any form of  reprisals against persons protected by such 
treaties.
Theodor Meron states the reason succinctly: ‘[I]nterstate reciprocity . . . is 
foreign to human rights’. Obviously, given the objective of  maximum 
protection of  human rights, it would be self-defeating for one breach of  
an agreement to open the door for another.
The traditional contract model is ‘tit for tat’; for pledges, the applicable 
principle is ‘two wrongs don’t make a right’. The difference in approaches 
reveals two important distinctions between contracts and pledges. First, 
it makes sense to speak about ‘wrongs’ only where there is a normative 
principle in the background, such that a retaliatory violation of  the agree-
ment can be characterized as independently wrongful. ‘Two wrongs 
don’t make a right’ presumes, obviously, that the issue is one about which 
 Yoram Dinstein, ‘Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law’, in 
Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues () –: ‘Article 
 of  the Third Geneva Conventions expressly proclaims: ‘‘Measures of  reprisal against prisoners 
of  war are prohibited.’’ Similar prohibitions of  reprisals against protected persons appear in the 
other Geneva Conventions and in Protocol I.’
 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () : 
‘Although the Swiss delegation introduced the amendment leading to Article () at the Vienna 
Conference on the Law of  Treaties primarily with the Geneva Conventions in mind, the delegation’s 
broader intent was “to put a curb on the harmful effects which the provisions of  Article  [now 
Article ] could have on individuals [and to create] a saving clause to protect human beings”.’ See 
also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with commentaries (, published by UN ), at Art : ‘Obligations not 
affected by countermeasures
. Countermeasures shall not affect:
. . . . (b) Obligations for the protection of  fundamental human rights.’
 ‘Conceptually, countermeasures are based on the principle of  interstate reciprocity, which, gen-
erally speaking, is foreign to human rights.’ Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Norms as Customary Law () –, citing Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the 
United Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process () –. See also Simma, ‘Self-
Contained Regimes’,  NethYB Int’l L  (). See also Theodor Meron, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () . (‘Draft Article (b) [of  the ILC Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility], which prohibits suspending obligations constituting peremptory norms of  
international law by taking countermeasures, is of  particular signifi cance to human rights and 
humanitarian norms.’) 
 The argument has been made that an exception to general reciprocity requirements ought to be 
made for reservations to human rights agreements. As a general matter, when one state signs a con-
vention subject to a reservation, then a reciprocal advantage is extended also to any other state in 
their mutual dealings. Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko, ‘Treaty Reservations and the 
Economics of  Article () of  the Vienna Convention’,  Berkeley J Int’l L ,  ():
‘[H]uman rights conventions obligate states to benefi t third parties, thereby rendering the automatic 
reciprocity effect of  reservations less effective than usual.’ 
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moral judgment is appropriate; it applies to violations of  treaties prohib-
iting genocide but not violation of  treaties of  friendship and commerce. 
Second, with pledges, the retaliating ‘wrong’ cannot be excused by the 
fact that the other party has already committed it. For pledges, there is 
no ‘eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’. Thus the two essential charac-
teristics of  a pledge are the shared understanding of  a moral foundation 
for the agreement, together with the understanding that the commitment 
to the underlying moral principle is not conditioned upon compliance by 
others. Pledges, that is to say, are both normative and unconditional.
III .  C  C
Both of  these doctrinal differences—obligations erga omnes and the pro-
hibition on retaliation in kind—relate to the consequences of  violations 
of  rights agreements, amending the traditional enforcement regime in 
important ways. More states are authorized to respond to a violation (the 
doctrine of  obligations erga omnes), but their choice of  responses is more 
limited (the impermissibility of  retaliatory suspension). The latter (while 
logical and desirable on its own terms) clearly restricts enforcement 
power (and thus has consequences for compliance), but the former has 
consequences for compliance, as well, by creating serious collective 
action problems. In situations where the treaty itself  has not established 
an effective coercive regime for enforcement of  the right (as is typically 
the case) the rights instruments are at greater risk of  non-enforcement 
than traditional contractual treaties.
The issue of  whether nations obey international law as a general matter 
has been a perennial topic of  debate for international lawyers and inter-
national relations scholars. In recent years increasing attention has 
been paid to the more specifi c question of  whether states observe human 
rights treaties. The results of  recent surveys have not been encour-
aging. The author of  one important empirical study fi nds no clear 
 connection, or possibly a slight negative correlation, between ratifi cation 
 The literature is vast and this Article will not attempt to list even the most important 
 representative works, but only the ones most directly relevant here. In addition to Oona Hathaway, 
‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ  (), see, eg, Louis Henkin, 
How Nations Behave (nd edn, )  (emphasis omitted) (‘almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of  international law and almost all of  their obligations almost all of  the time’); Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance witih International 
Regulatory Agreements ()  (‘foreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of  a general 
propensity of  states to comply with international obligations’); Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?’,  Yale LJ  ().
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ  (); 
Eric Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights? ’,  J 
Confl ict Resolution  (forthcoming ), most recent version available at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/Humanrightsarticle.
pdf>; Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, ‘A Theory of  Customary International Law’,  U Chi 
L Rev  ().
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of  human rights conventions and human rights conditions. Another 
study (undertaken from a game theoretic point of  view) explains away 
apparent patterns of  compliance with customary international law of  
human rights by saying that most states simply have no incentives to 
commit certain sorts of  violations. In light of  the current debate sur-
rounding compliance with human rights and humanitarian agreements, 
the argument that rights agreements have different objectives and incen-
tive structures from traditional contractual treaties takes on particular 
signifi cance.
Much of  the more optimistic literature about state compliance with 
treaty obligations relies on the contractual aspects of  interstate agree-
ments. One author who explicitly analogizes treaties to contracts rec-
ognizes three general categories of  incentives for states to fulfi ll their 
treaty obligations: ‘balance of  advantages,’ ‘the deterrent element . . . of  the 
possible countermeasures,’ and ‘international credibility’. Enforcement 
strategies relying on the contractual aspects of  treaties are unlikely to 
work well, however, when applied to rights agreements. Rights agree-
ments are at a pronounced disadvantage when it comes to strategies for 
enforcement because they are grounded on moral commitment rather 
than reciprocal state interest. This is not to say that rights agreements 
should be denied legal enforcement on the grounds that they are not 
 traditional treaties, but rather that from a practical point of  view, estab-
lishment of  an effective enforcement mechanism is likely to be diffi cult. 
The three strategies of  ‘balance of  advantages,’ countermeasures, and 
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  
(): ‘Yet given that I fi nd not a single treaty for which ratifi cation seems to be reliably associated 
with better human rights practices and several for which it appears to be associated with worse prac-
tices, it would be premature to dismiss the possibility that human rights treaties may sometimes lead 
to poorer human rights practices within the countries that ratify them’.
 Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, ‘A Theory of  Customary International Law’,  U Chi 
L Rev ,  (): ‘Some nations in history have committed genocide, but most nations most 
of  the time do not. International legal scholars use this behavioral regularity of  not committing 
genocide, in combination with many pronouncements (including the Genocide treaty), as evidence 
that nations respect the prohibition on genocide as a legal obligation. As usual, this account is con-
sistent with the appearance of  a compliance pattern but cannot explain either violations of  the norm 
or the reason why nations appear to comply with it. A better explanation is that the absence of  geno-
cide refl ects a coincidence of  interest’.
 JAS Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein (eds),  The Major International Treaties of the 
Twentieth Century () at  (‘[a]n international treaty can be viewed as a bargain or contract’).
 JAS Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein (eds),  The Major International Treaties of the 
Twentieth Century () at – (emphasis added): ‘There are three inducements for keeping treaty 
provisions which are generally more important than any other: fi rst, the positive one that a treaty 
contains a balance of  advantages and the country which violates a treaty must expect to lose its 
advantages. . . . [A] serious violation of  a treaty may end it. . . . The second inducement for keeping a 
treaty is the deterrent element it may contain. Before acting, political leaders have to decide whether 
the violation of  a treaty is worth the risk of  the possible countermeasures taken by the aggrieved state 
or states. A third inducement is that a government has to consider its international credibility; failure 
to fulfi ll a treaty may well weaken the defaulting country’s international position as other states cal-
culate whether treaties still in force with it will be honoured, and whether new agreements can any 
longer usefully be concluded.’
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international credibility are insuffi cient to ensure the enforcement of  
international rights agreements.
A. ‘The Balance of  Advantages’, or Reciprocity
Probably the most important inducement for a state to comply with 
treaty obligations is the benefi t it derives from the treaty regime, which it 
would be denied if  other states retaliated by not complying, or if  the 
regime collapsed altogether from general withdrawal of  support. Much 
contemporary scholarship therefore gravitates towards a game-theoretic 
analysis of  treaty compliance, explaining compliance as a rational strat-
egy of  ‘cooperation’ in an ‘iterated prisoners’ dilemma’. This analysis 
has little or no force in the context of  rights agreements, which are not 
motivated by reciprocity.
Under the game-theoretic approach, the primary motivation for com-
pliance with one’s own treaty obligations is to keep other treaty partners 
from defecting, as well. The general rule about reprisals—incorporated in 
Article  of  the Vienna Convention—is interpreted as a ‘tit for tat’ strat-
egy. John Setear, a proponent of  this approach, reasons as follows:
Article  thus gives legal blessing to an essential part of  the tit-for-tat strategy: 
If  one party defects (i.e., breaches materially in a bilateral agreement) in a given 
iteration, then the other party may legally defect (i.e., is released from its own 
obligations) in the next iteration.
From a game-theoretic point of  view, he continues, reciprocal non- 
performance is a rational and practical method of  ensuring compliance 
by other signatories:
This alignment of  international law and the teachings of  rationalist IR theory 
seems laudable. If  a breach by one party never released other parties from their 
 In recent years, international relations theory has had an increasingly signifi cant impact on 
legal scholarship. See, eg Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ ()  AJIL , ,  (); Kenneth W Abbott, 
‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’,  Yale J Int’l L 
, – (). A particularly infl uential work in political science has been Robert Axelrod, The 
Evolution of Cooperation (), which pioneered the application of  ‘tit for tat’ strategy to prisoner’s 
dilemma games. See also Robert Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’,  International 
Organizations  ().
For applications of  game theory to treaty compliance, see, eg, Scott Barrett, Environment and 
Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (); John K Setear, ‘Responses to 
Breach of  a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of  Release and 
Remediation in the Law of  Treaties and of  State Responsibility’,  Va L Rev ().
 John K Setear, ‘Responses to Breach of  a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations 
Theory: The Rules of  Release and Remediation in the Law of  Treaties and of  State Responsibility’, 
 Va L Rev ,  (): ‘If  we extend the view of  international cooperation as an IPD to the ques-
tion of  treaty law, then the general idea behind Article —the release of  parties from their treaty 
obligations after certain kinds of  important breaches—is perfectly sensible in light of  the utility of  the 
tit-for-tat strategy in promoting cooperation.’
 John K Setear, ‘Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations 
Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and of State Responsibility’,  
Va L Rev ,  ().
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obligations, then the victims of  a breach would need to choose between obeying 
international law and protecting themselves against repeated exploitation by the 
breacher. Removing parties from the horns of  such a dilemma creates a system, 
i.e., treaty law, that is more likely to encourage cooperation to evolve between 
parties faced with an IPD.
This argument assumes (as is reasonable in the case of  most traditional 
contractual treaties) that it is costly for a state to comply with its treaty 
obligations, but that a state should ordinarily be willing to do so as long 
as it is confi dent that it will receive the benefi ts of  performance by its 
treaty partners. According to this analysis, each side is deterred from 
defecting because it has a stake in the continued vitality of  the treaty 
regime, from which it receives advantages. To be deterred by the pos-
sibility of  retaliation in kind, however, a state contemplating a violation 
must not only believe that such retaliation is likely to occur; it must also 
care. Neither of  these conditions is likely to be satisfi ed in the case of  
pledges in general, or rights agreements in particular; retaliation in kind 
is not an effective threat because (fi rst) it is unlikely to occur and (second) 
the violating state would be indifferent to it, in any event.
Retaliation in kind is unlikely because it is a classic example of  cutting 
off  one’s nose to spite one’s face. A state that cares enough about indi-
vidual rights to be willing to police human rights conditions in other 
countries is unlikely to respond to a violation in one state by abusing its 
own nationals. Violating states can be confi dent that their behavior is 
unlikely to trigger comparable abuses in law-abiding states. Even if  
another state were so inclined, moreover, retaliation against individuals is 
specifi cally prohibited by Article () of  the Vienna Convention—the 
very article that supposedly incorporates the ‘tit for tat’ strategy. 
Yoram Dinstein observes correctly that ‘practical considerations of  
 reciprocity and fear of  reprisals’ cannot be relied on in the enforcement 
of  international humanitarian law:
Ordinarily, the implementation of  the law of  armed confl ict hinges, to a very large 
degree, on practical considerations of  reciprocity and the fear of  reprisals . . . The 
prospect of  reprisals serves as a sobering and inhibiting factor on a state which 
contemplates a departure from accepted norms of  behavior. However, when state 
 John K Setear, ‘Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations 
Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and of State Responsibility’, 
 Va L Rev ,  ().
 There are various technical qualifi cations that must be kept in mind. For example, the extent 
to which potential for reciprocal defection acts as a deterrent depends on factors such as the possi-
bility of  accurate detection of  a defection by the other side and discount over time. The game the-
oretic literature addresses these problems as they affect treaty compliance regimes; they are not 
important for present purposes.
 The same argument applies to treaty reservations, which are normally reciprocal. ‘In the face 
of  a unilateral reservation of  one state, it would hardly benefi t the other non-reserving states by 
guaranteeing the same “right” to deny human right protection under similar circumstances.’ 
Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko, ‘Treaty Reservations and the Economics of  Article () 
of  the Vienna Convention’,  Berkeley J Int’l L ,  ().
 See text at n  above.
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A commits an illegal act against state B warranting reprisals, state B is not allowed 
to retaliate by performing an act which constitutes a violation of  the independent 
human rights of  persons who had nothing to do with the  original illegality. Thus, 
if  state A kills prisoners of  war of  state B, state B (while entitled to retaliate in 
other ways) may not kill prisoners of  war of  state A.
Finally, even if  retaliation in kind were both likely and permissible, it 
would have little or no impact on the typical state contemplating viola-
tion. A state that is unwilling or unable to meet its own obligations under 
a rights agreement has little or no reason to care whether other states 
reciprocate. In the fi rst place, in the context of  human rights agree-
ments, the victims of  retaliatory measures would most likely be the 
 citizens of  other states; the violating state has no reason whatsoever to 
care about them. Moreover, even if  it were possible for other states to 
retaliate against the violating state’s own nationals (for instance because 
they were residing abroad), a state that does not care about human rights 
generally might be completely indifferent.
Reciprocity is a very unsuitable basis for enforcement of  rights agree-
ments. This is precisely because they take the form of  pledges which, 
unlike contracts, are not motivated by the desire for other states’ perform-
ance. A state that violates human rights has little or no interest in whether 
 Yoram Dinstein, ‘Human Rights in Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law’ in 
Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues () –. See also 
Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  () 
(citing Louis Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics, Values and Functions’,  Recueil des Cours 
D’Academie de Droit International  (), at ): ‘Moreover, as Louis Henkin puts it, “the prin-
cipal element of  horizontal deterrence is missing” in the area of  human rights: “the threat that ‘if  
you violate the human rights of  your inhabitants, we will violate the human rights of  our inhabitants’ 
hardly serves as a deterrent”.’
 Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, ‘A Theory of  Customary International Law’,  U CHI 
L Rev ,  (): ‘Consider a world of  two nations, A which abuses its citizens and B which 
does not. A gains nothing if  both nations agree to stop abusing citizens. The same is true if  both A 
and B abuse their citizens. They lose something and gain nothing from a mutual agreement to pro-
vide greater protection to their citizens.’
 There has been some speculation that states might receive reciprocal benefi t in the form of  
better treatment of  their own nationals while they are residing abroad. See, eg Jack L Goldsmith and 
Eric A Posner, ‘Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary 
International Law’,  Va J Int’l L ,  (): ‘Cooperation. It is possible for two states to 
cooperate in not abusing their citizens. For example, State A contains a minority of  people who have 
ethnic affi nities with the majority of  B, and B contains a minority of  people who have ethnic affi nities 
with the majority of  A. If  the majorities in each state feel altruism toward their co-ethnics in the 
other state, one can imagine the development of  a norm of  reciprocal tolerance towards the minority 
populations in both states. Indeed, such bilateral guarantees for minority religious rights occurred 
in treaties throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . .  [A]bsent special circumstances 
like the minority rights situation, a nation otherwise inclined to abuse its citizens gains nothing from 
declining to do so in return for a reciprocal commitment from another nation to do the same.’
 Eric Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human 
Rights?’,  J Confl ict Resolution  (forthcoming ), most recent version available at <http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk///JournalofConfl ictResolution_().pdf>, at –: ‘Given that a country’s citi-
zens often reside in many foreign countries, a country with high human rights standards might be 
concerned about the fate of  its own citizens abroad and therefore benefi t from an effective inter-
national human rights regime . . .  However, countries with low standards are not likely to share such 
benefi ts. Given they do not respect the human rights of  their citizens living in their own country, why 
would they benefi t from knowing that the human rights of  their citizens are respected abroad?’
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other states do so, as well. ‘Tit for tat’ is irrelevant—no, pernicious—in the 
context of  rights agreements. The second sort of  enforcement strategy to 
examine is countermeasures other than retaliation in kind.
B. Countermeasures
If  retaliation in kind is ruled out, then states can resort to other forms of  
countermeasures (eg trade sanctions, cutoffs in foreign aid, and exclusion 
from cultural or athletic events). There are two problems with coun-
termeasures of  this sort. First, as is well appreciated, sanctions are costly 
to coordinate and impose. Second, even those states that do have human 
rights enforcement policies focus not on the treaty language but on the 
underlying moral norms; it is therefore not clear what added value rights 
agreements contribute to the enforcement effort.
Consider, fi rst, the diffi culty in motivating states to maintain counter-
measures. The problem with decentralized enforcement of  rights agree-
ments is that, just as no particular state benefi ts from compliance, so also 
no particular state suffers from non-compliance. When a traditional 
 contractual treaty is violated there is an aggrieved state with an interest 
in taking action. In a regime of  obligations erga omnes, however, even 
where there are states with suffi cient clout to take action, they typically 
lack incentive to take the initiative. Collective action problems undercut 
any move towards sanctions.
Sanctions require actions that the enforcing state would not otherwise 
take and which might be costly to local interests, such as arms embargoes. 
As threats, they are credible only if  the violator believes that they will 
actually be imposed; this is unlikely unless for some reason they make the 
enforcing state better off  (or, at the very least, not worse off):
Economists have argued that enforcement mechanisms such as sanctions to deter 
non-compliance have to be self-enforcing in the sense that recourse to an exter-
nal enforcement agency is not feasible and have to be renegotiation-proof. A 
sanction will only be credible if  the threatening group of  countries is better off  
actually executing the sanction than refraining from execution and renegotiating 
a new agreement with the free-riding country.
Such sanctions are diffi cult to devise. Retaliation in kind—reciprocity—is 
the ideal sanction because it consists of  allowing the state to do what it 
prefers to do, but would have been forbidden to do with the treaty in 
place. As we have already noted, however, retaliation in kind is not a suit-
able sanction for rights agreements.
Sanctions are particularly diffi cult to impose when the target state has 
a power base of  its own, such as substantial oil reserves, an ally on the 
 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law ()  
(‘Because states are reluctant to bring actions for human rights breaches, countermeasures are an 
extremely important mechanism for enforcing human rights’).
 See n  above at .
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Security Council, or a key position in the ‘war on terror’. It is therefore 
not surprising that sanctions are an infrequent occurrence, imposed 
mainly when a state’s own nationals have been injured:
Powerful countries rarely employ sanctions—political, economic, military or 
otherwise—to coerce other countries into improving their human rights record. 
Indeed, for the most part, countries take relatively little interest in the extent of  
human rights violations in other countries, unless one of  their own citizens is 
affected.
Even those formal complaint mechanisms that do exist are infrequently 
employed. In noting the underutilization of  existing institutional com-
plaint mechanisms, Theodor Meron observes that ‘most state com-
plaints [that actually were fi led] were motivated by the special ethnic or 
religious relationship of  the complaining states with the victims of  the 
alleged violations rather than by the common interest in vindication of  
human rights’. Countermeasures, as a general matter, are not an effect-
ive deterrent because states lack the altruistic willingness to bear the costs 
of  imposing them.
A second reason to doubt the utility of  countermeasures is that, even 
when states have been willing to employ them, the countermeasures fre-
quently are unrelated to the signing of  an agreement. Countermeasures 
are not undertaken as enforcement of  rights agreements, per se, but as 
response to violations of  moral norms that matter to the enforcing state. 
While the effect of  such countermeasures may perhaps be benefi cial 
overall, the countermeasures cannot be characterized as a strategy of  
enforcing treaty compliance.
In response to lobbying by human rights advocacy groups, for example, 
the US Government started monitoring human rights conditions abroad, 
 Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, ‘A Theory of  Customary International Law’,  U Chi 
L Rev ,  (): ‘[I]t is very costly for the United States to enforce international human 
rights, and it tends to do so in two situations that present special enforcement incentives. The fi rst 
occurs when one nation’s human rights violations pose a signifi cant adverse threat to the United 
States. This explains the United States intervention in the former Yugoslavia (to avoid a broader 
European confl ict) and Haiti (to avoid a domestic crisis in Florida). A second context where we fi nd 
human rights enforcement is when the federal government receives domestic political benefi ts from 
enforcement, and the costs of  such enforcement—in economic or military terms—are low. Examples 
of  this phenomenon are U.S. economic sanctions against weak and unpopular countries like Cuba 
and Myanmar. In general, the United States will not enforce human rights if  enforcement is costly 
and the strategic benefi ts of  enforcement are low or uncertain.’
 See n  above at  (emphasis added).
 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () –: 
‘Signifi cantly, despite the existing interstate institutional machinery in the OAS system, no conten-
tious case has yet been submitted by one state against another. Only about a score of  interstate 
complaints have been submitted to the European Commission of  Human Rights under Article  of  
the European Convention. In no case has a provision granting the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction to 
determine the interpretation or application of  a human rights treaty been invoked before the ICJ.’
 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () – 
(states unwilling to antagonize one another by bringing actions).
 Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law () 
 n .
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issuing annual State Department country reports. Strikingly, these 
State Department reports freely criticize countries for conduct they 
never legally committed themselves not to engage in. A standard set of  
criteria are applied to all countries examined, regardless of  what treaties 
the countries in question have signed. No effort is made to establish 
that the ‘human rights violation’ complained of  is a violation of  inter-
national law; all that matters is whether the activity in question contra-
venes US human rights policy.
For example, one category included in the reports is a country’s treat-
ment of  persons with disabilities; no effort is made to tie the country 
critiques to any relevant treaty obligations, and it does not seem that most 
of  the states reported on have actually signed any international agree-
ment addressing the matter. The annual country reports’ treatment of  
discrimination against women is particularly interesting. Not only have 
some of  the states criticized in the annual reports never signed the 
Convention on Elimination of  Discrimination Against Women, but 
the United States itself  still refuses to ratify the convention. It is diffi cult 
to cast the annual reports as designed to enforce compliance with a treaty 
to which neither the enforcing state nor the target state has agreed.
 These reports are available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/>.
 The standard topics covered in these reports include: () respect for the integrity of  the per-
son, including freedom from arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of  life, disappearance, torture, and 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, 
denial of  fair public trial, arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, and 
use of  excessive force and violations of  humanitarian law in internal confl icts; () respect for civil 
liberties, which includes freedom of  speech and press, freedom of  peaceful assembly and association, 
freedom of  religion, and freedom of  movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and 
repatriation; () respect for political rights and the right of  citizens to change their government; 
() governmental attitude regarding international and nongovernmental investigation of  alleged 
violations of  human rights; () discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or 
social status; and () workers’ rights, including the right of  association, the right to bargain collect-
ively, prohibition of  forced or compulsory labour, status of  child labour practices and minimum age 
for employment, acceptable conditions of  work, and traffi cking in persons.
 There are no generally applicable international agreements that explicitly address the rights of  
the disabled. There are several pertinent regional agreements: the European Council’s Convention 
for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights; and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in 
the Area of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art . However, most countries that are criti-
cized for failing to respect the rights of  the disabled are not parties to any of  these agreements.
 Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
 December ,  ILM . Iran, for example, has not signed the relevant conventions prohibit-
ing discrimination against women, but Iran is cited in the Annual Reports for gender discrimination, 
nonetheless. US Department of  State, Bureau of  Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices—: Iran ( February ), at <http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/hrrpt//.htm>.
 The current administration’s arguments against ratifying CEDAW include that it will under-
mine ‘traditional’ moral and social values, including motherhood, marriage, and family structure, 
and that it will provide women with a right to abortion on demand. See, eg, United Nations 
Association of  the United States of  America and the Business Council for the United Nations, UN 
Convention on the Elimination of  all Forms of  Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), March 
, at <http://www.womenstreaty.org//CEDAW%Book%Appendix%.pdf>.
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The annual reports are so indifferent to whether a particular country 
has signed the relevant rights agreements that Oona Hathaway was able 
to use them as a database for comparing the human rights practices of  
states that have ratifi ed particular human rights treaties with the human 
rights practices of  states that have not. The reports can be taken as a 
useful database for comparative purposes precisely because they include 
equally comprehensive assessments of  the practices of  non-ratifying, as 
well as ratifying, states. Nor (needless to say) do the reports concern 
themselves with violations of  human rights agreements with which the 
United States happens not to agree. The Reports simply cannot be 
characterized as a system of  sanctions for treaty non-compliance.
Ensconcing a moral principle in an international rights agreement, it 
seems, does not necessarily give the principle any more force than it 
would already have. The limited extent to which human rights concerns 
are infl uential in US policy seems to have little to do with whether the 
norm in question is or is not the subject of  an international agreement. 
Countermeasures—when they are used at all—are not employed to 
enforce rights agreements, but to impose the enforcing state’s view of  
human rights on states that violate it.
C. Reputation and ‘Shaming’
Oona Hathaway’s recent infl uential empirical study of  compliance with 
human rights treaties agrees that state sanctions for violations of  human 
rights agreements are minimal. She notes that direct sanctions are rare 
and threats of  retaliation in kind are untenable. Few observers of  the 
 For the same reason, she relied on reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
and Freedom House. Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale 
LJ ,  n  (): ‘The four most prominent sources of  comprehensive cross-national time 
series information on a broad spectrum of  human rights practices are the United States Department 
of  State Country Reports on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch’s reports, Amnesty International’s 
Country Reports, and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports.’
Hathaway herself  notes that ‘neither NGOs nor Western states tend to limit their focus to treaty 
ratifi ers’. Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  
().
 For example, the US does not believe that capital punishment is a violation of  international 
human rights, but many other states have signed instruments prohibiting it. See n  below. The 
annual reports do not inquire into whether the targeted countries practice capital punishment, even 
if  the countries in question have signed conventions outlawing it.
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  
(), citing Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (nd edn, ), at  (emphasis added): ‘[The] 
major engines of  compliance that exist in other areas of  international law are for the most part absent 
in the area of  human rights’ . . .  [U]nlike in the case of trade agreements, the costs of retaliatory non-
compliance are low to nonexistent, because a nation’s actions against its own citizens do not directly 
threaten or harm other states. Human rights law thus stands out as an area of  international law in 
which countries have little incentive to police noncompliance with treaties or norms. As Henkin 
remarked, ‘The forces that induce compliance with other law . . . do not pertain equally to the law of  
human rights’.
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  
(): ‘Direct sanctions in the form of  economic or military reprisal for human rights treaty viola-
tions are so rare . . . that states are unlikely to conform their actions to a treaty solely on that basis. 
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international human rights scene would be surprised at her conclusion 
that ‘reputation’ becomes, by default, the most attractive enforcement 
alternative:
The institutional model is left, then, with reputation as the primary anchor of  
compliance for all but those countries for which compliance is costless: States 
comply with human rights treaties to obtain or maintain a reputation for 
 compliance and hence good international citizenship. In the institutional model, 
therefore, if  countries change their behavior in response to human rights treat-
ies, it is largely because of  concern for their reputation.
Shaming—exposing violations publicly and organizing public criticism—is 
the tactic most frequently employed by advocacy groups and therefore 
probably the one with which the general public is most familiar. Reputation 
is the third inducement to compliance that must be considered.
An obvious advantage to reputational strategies is that they can be 
employed by non-State actors, who may be more motivated than states to 
pressure violators. Given the proliferation of  watchdog groups, and 
the profusion of  their published reports, it is diffi cult to avoid the impres-
sion that these strategies are gaining ground. While exposure may be less 
effective as a sanction than cutting off  aid or imposing trade sanctions, if  
these more forceful countermeasures are unavailable, then shaming may 
be the most effective vehicle for action.
But as was true of  state-imposed countermeasures, shaming by advo-
cacy groups is rarely directed to treaty enforcement per se. As with the 
State Department reports, advocacy groups’ investigations apply the 
same critical standards to all states equally, with little attention to the 
question of  which conventions the criticized state has actually signed. 
For example, the United States is criticized for its death penalty policies 
(especially the juvenile death penalty) even though the United States has 
been careful either not to sign, or to make reservations to, treaties or con-
ventions inconsistent with its policies on capital punishment. Similarly, 
although few states have signed treaties to protect migrant workers, the 
And the threat of  retaliatory noncompliance with the treaty does not have the power that it does in 
other contexts, such as trade or arms agreements, as a threat that a treaty party will violate the treaty 
in retaliation for violations by another party is untenable.’ 
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  
().
 A state’s relationships with other states—including human rights violators—necessarily have 
many different facets, all of  which must be taken into account in arriving at a decision about coun-
termeasures. Advocacy groups, in contrast, can focus single-mindedly on their specifi c missions.
 See, eg, Amnesty International, Amnesty International Annual Reports : United States of 
America, at <http://web.amnesty.org/report/usa-summary-eng> (visited  June ); Human 
Rights Watch, ‘United States of America’, in Human Rights Watch World Report () –. 
Although the United States has signed treaties that could be construed as banning the death penalty, 
particularly with regard to juveniles, it is US policy to attach a reservation to any policy in a conven-
tion with which it is unwilling to conform. For example, whereas the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights prohibits execution of  juveniles, the United States entered the following reser-
vation: ‘The United States reserves the right, subject to its constitutional constraints, to impose 
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or 
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practices of  those states that discriminate against them are criticized, 
nonetheless. Indeed, sometimes the criticism leveled in human rights 
reports is that a state ought to sign a particular convention. While an 
intelligent strategy for human rights advocacy, such criticism has nothing 
to do with treaty compliance.
The focus of  these published reports is on exposing what actually 
 happened, not whether a particular state has honored its treaty obliga-
tions. The gravamen of  the advocacy groups’ complaints is not treaty 
violation per se, but violation of  the moral norms that underlie the treaty. 
Such complaints are not about shaming states into fulfi lling legal, treaty 
based, obligations; they are about shaming states into fulfi lling their 
moral obligations. This is not to say that human rights groups should 
limit their criticisms to states that have signed treaties; moral criticism is 
well within their mandate. The point, rather, is that the most effectively 
enforced human rights policies seem to be those that are based directly 
on underlying moral norms and not on treaties. Given that both Amnesty 
International and the US Department of  State seem to attach little 
importance in the ‘shaming’ context to whether target states are actually 
parties to the treaties in question, it is unclear what purpose is served by 
putting the norms in question into treaty form.
D. Individual Benefi ciaries, International Guarantors, 
and Compliance with Pledges
Although the above discussion concerns human rights and humanitarian 
law agreements, these observations about the diffi culties of  enforcement 
pertain equally to pledges, generally. Embodying the moral rights of  
third parties in an international agreement results in a distinctly non-
reciprocal structure. It is the increasing attention to the rights of  non-
State actors (whether human beings, animals, fragile habitats, or cultural 
objects) that has led to forms of  international agreement that are particu-
larly diffi cult to enforce.
There was a time when it was generally assumed that international law, 
and international treaties, were the exclusive province of  states. In such 
future laws permitting the imposition of  capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes 
committed by persons below eighteen years of  age.’
US Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, d Congress, d Sess., in  Cong. Rec. S.  ( April ).
 See, eg, Human Rights Watch, ‘Angola’ in Human Rights Watch World Report () –; 
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Annual Reports : South Korea, at <http://web.
amnesty.org/report/kor-summary-eng> (visited  June ).
 For example, the US has refused to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This has led to immense pressure from human rights 
groups. See, eg Human Rights Watch, CEDAW: The Women’s Treaty ( January ), at <http://
hrw.org/campaigns/cedaw>; Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Take Action: Help Ratify the 
Women’s Rights Convention! ( September ), at <http://www.mnadvocates.org/Take_Action__
Help_Ratify_The_Women_s_Rights_Convention!.html>; Amnesty International USA, Ratify the 
Women’s Rights Treaty (), at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/cedaw/index.html>.
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a world, one would not have expected treaties to accomplish much more 
than reciprocal exchanges of  promises of  the traditional contractual sort, 
with the interests of  the states themselves the exclusive focus. There is 
now considerable agreement, however, that international law need not 
concern itself  exclusively with states, and neither should international 
agreements. The rights of  non-State actors matter, too. These are pro-
tected by traditional reciprocal ‘contractual’ agreements only if  suffi cient 
state advantage exists.
Human rights, environmental, animal rights, and other advocacy 
groups go beyond state interest when they lobby for the adoption of  
treaties refl ecting humanitarian, environmental, cultural, or other values. 
Rights agreements, species protection treaties, habitat preservation con-
ventions, and other pledges are promoted and adopted regardless of  the 
existence of  suffi cient reciprocal benefi t, simply because they represent 
the right thing to do. A state wishing to protect third party interests 
might make a domestic law commitment to observe these moral values, 
for instance by adopting the norm in question into legislative or consti-
tutional provision. But a state can always change (or ignore) its domestic 
law. A pledge to the international community carries the commitment 
one step further; states promise one another that they will respect third 
party rights. The other states are not the benefi ciaries of  the promise, but 
rather the guarantors.
It is the absence of  a secure grounding in reciprocal state interests that 
creates the special enforcement problems facing rights agreements in par-
ticular and pledges generally. States lack suffi cient stake in the continued 
vitality of  such regimes to be willing to devote resources to their enforce-
ment. Grounded on moral commitment rather than self-interest, pledges 
to respect third party interests are intrinsically insecure. Pledges take the 
form of  contractual treaties, on the surface, but they are not founded fi rst 
and foremost on reciprocity.
 A good example of  a situation in which contractual agreements have the effect of  protecting 
nonstate actors is that of  international investment agreements. Developing states need investment in 
manufacturing and infrastructure; multinational corporations are willing to supply the necessary 
capital only if  given adequate assurances that their investments will be protected from expropriation 
or related dangers. A web of  contractual and treaty agreements provides the necessary guarantees. 
States sign investment agreements committing themselves to international arbitration in the case of  
dispute, and states by treaty bind themselves to respect the results of  these international arbitrations. 
Where states fi nd it in their interests to protect non-State actors, they look for ways to do so (and 
often succeed). See, eg, Nigel Blackaby, ‘Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration’, in 
(Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary 
Questions (),  (outlining ‘overriding public interest in effective foreign investment protec-
tion’): ‘States recognize that effective investor protection promotes foreign investment—they 
proudly display their record in this regard on their foreign investment propaganda, promising a 
secure environment for such investments underpinned by effective international law standards. As 
the tribunal in Amco v Indonesia noted: “To protect investment is to protect the general interests of  
development and of  developing countries”.’ The enforceability of  arbitral awards in domestic courts 
is addressed by the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards 
(New York Convention), .
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IV .  T V  P:   R 
These observations on the compliance problems with pledges raise 
doubts about the value of  embodying moral values in legal instruments. 
It is not clear what good it does to take a moral norm and formalize it as 
a legal convention. A cynic would say that adoption of  'morally declara-
tory' conventions—pledges—is pointless; states may choose to respect the 
underlying moral norm or not, as they wish, but embedding the norm in 
a legal instrument does not increase the odds. Rights advocates, obvi-
ously, are likely to be more optimistic that embedding moral norms in 
legal conventions gives them added force. They are a driving force behind 
the drafting of  many such agreements and consider their entrance into 
force a genuine accomplishment.
Settling this difference of  opinion requires formulation of  a research 
agenda that recognizes the peculiar character of  pledges. Rather than 
asking, ‘[d]o states obey the treaties they sign?’—a perfectly appropriate 
question in regard to treaties in general—the question should be, ‘Do 
states honor the pledges that they make to any greater degree than they 
would honor the underlying moral norm the pledge embodies?’ The dis-
cussion below outlines fi rst the cynical answer to this question and then 
the more optimistic response. In describing the cynical and the optimis-
tic accounts of  the value of  pledges, this concluding section identifi es 
some of  the empirical and analytical questions that should be central to 
any future research agenda for pledging.
A. Two Competing Accounts
The cynic sees the drafting of  morally declaratory conventions as a 
pointless exercise. He or she would dismiss as naïve those rights activists 
who sincerely believe that they have accomplished something by redu-
cing a moral norm to formal written agreement. The cynic may even 
suspect that legal conventions can be genuinely pernicious, misleading 
the public into believing that the state of  human rights around the world 
is better than it is. Conventions soothe the consciences of  western elites 
while achieving nothing in the world at large: this is the cynical view.
The cynic would dismiss much convention-drafting as refl ecting 
mainly the institutional self  interests of  the participating rights activists. 
A small circle of  elite repeat players—representatives of  private NGOs, 
UN agencies, and academic think tanks, together with a smattering of  
carefully selected indigenous third world political activists—all poten-
tially benefi t from participation in the process of  drafting and adoption. 
The expensive conferences held in exotic venues provide self-serving 
participants a sense of  accomplishment wholly out of  proportion to what 
they actually achieve. Each new convention adds lustre and legitimacy to 
 My use of  the phrase ‘morally declaratory’ is explained in the text at n  above.
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the participating groups’ political profi les, and the ability to claim credit 
for helping to secure adoption of  a rights convention gives a helpful boost 
to fundraising.
The cynic might acknowledge that in certain circumstances an under-
lying moral norm could have international consequences, but would deny 
that a state feels any more bound by a moral norm simply because it has 
been formalized as a convention. What force conventions do have comes 
from the norms underlying them; the legal instrument is irrelevant. 
Those lobbying for stronger human rights policies do not take their 
 values from treaties, and their ability to infl uence foreign policy depends 
on whether they have domestic political clout, not whether their views 
refl ect international treaty law.
At the opposite end of  the spectrum are the optimists; Dean Harold 
Koh is one of  these. He posits a process by which moral norms are trans-
formed over time into a binding principle of  conduct, accepted as 
authoritative by the international community. In many cases, he says, it 
is ‘transnational norm entrepreneurs’ who supply the initial impetus for 
formulation of  norms and then shepherd the norms through the process 
to eventual acceptance. He includes in this category individuals as 
diverse as Eleanor Roosevelt, Jesse Jackson, the Dalai Lama, Aung Sang 
Suu Kyi, and Princess Diana, as well as ‘governmental norm sponsors’ 
such as UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson, Presidents 
Oscar Arias of  Costa Rica and Jimmy Carter of  the United States, and 
the Pope.
The sponsors’ fi rst step towards full legal effi cacy, Koh asserts, is to 
obtain authoritative recognition of  the norm in question before some 
‘law-declaring forum’:
Such law-declaring fora thus include treaty regimes; domestic, regional, and 
international courts; ad hoc tribunals; domestic and regional legislatures; execu-
tive entities; international publicists; and nongovernmental organizations: law-
declaring fora that create an ‘interpretive community’ that is capable of  defi ning, 
elaborating and testing the defi nition of  particular norms and their 
violation.
 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ , 
 (): ‘[T]he key agents in this transnational legal process are transnational norm entrepre-
neurs, governmental norm sponsors, transnational issue networks, interpretive communities and law 
declaring fora, bureaucratic compliance procedures, and issue linkages among issue areas.
Many efforts at human rights norm-internalization are begun not by nation states, but by “trans-
national norm entrepreneurs,” private transnational organizations or individuals who mobilize 
 popular opinion and political support within their host country and abroad for the development of  
a universal human rights norm.’
 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ , 
 (). See also ibid. at : ‘Today, modern transnational norm entrepreneurs include most 
of  our recent Nobel Peace Prize winners: Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi, East Timor’s Bishop Belo 
and Jose Ramos-Horta, Tibet’s Dalai Lama, Britain’s Amnesty International, and America’s Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and Jody Williams of  the Landmines Coalition’.
 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ , 
 ().
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This account of  formal recognition in some ‘law-declaring forum’ is an 
apt description of  how activists go about formulating and promoting 
state adoption of  pledges.
The next step is for domestic actors to internalize these norms and 
their interpretation:
Within national governments and intergovernmental organizations, for example, 
in-house lawyers and legal advisers acquire institutional mandates to ensure that 
the government’s policies conform to international legal standards that have 
become embedded in domestic law.
As domestic actors become progressively acculturated to these norms, 
Koh asserts, they come to accept them as binding and to apply them 
automatically in their own decision-making:
[O]ver time, domestic decision-making structures become ‘enmeshed’ with 
international legal norms, so that institutional arrangements for the making and 
maintenance of  an international commitment become entrenched in domestic 
legal and political processes. Gradually, legal ideologies come to prevail among 
domestic decision-makers so that they seek to avoid perceptions that their 
actions will be perceived as domestically unlawful.
Thus Koh sees adoption of  a moral norm into legally cognizable form as 
the fi rst step in a process by which human rights norms come to be rec-
ognized and obeyed as authoritative. The norm then percolates through 
and permeates a state’s domestic legal system, ultimately winning the 
hearts and minds of  foreign policy decision-makers.
B. The Need for Empirical Data
Neither of  these accounts provides suffi cient specifi city and supporting 
data to settle the question. Koh’s account is anecdotal, giving no reason 
to believe that the process he describes will lead generally to the result he 
favors. The cynical account lacks empirical support, as well, being based 
mainly on lack of  positive reason to have confi dence in the optimists’ 
predictions. To this date, little or no study has been done comparing the 
effi cacy of  international legal norms with the effi cacy of  international 
moral norms.
Koh postulates a mechanism by which international norms can pene-
trate and infl uence the domestic sphere, ultimately shaping the choices 
made by foreign relations decision-makers. But this is far short of  an 
argument that all or most of  them will. Koh gives no basis for optimism 
that success is likely. The existence of  occasional success stories no more 
proves that normative conventions will eventually receive their due 
 ibid at  ‘The next vertical step is for national governments to internalize norm interpreta-
tions issued by the global interpretive community into their domestic bureaucratic and political 
structures’.
 ibid.
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 international recognition than the occasional Horatio Alger story proves 
that American capitalism invariably rewards merit.
Koh’s description of  the campaign to ban landmines is illuminating. 
The process he describes is highly serendipitous. The campaign was initi-
ated in late , he says, by a group of  NGOs in Washington. The 
group was able to attract the support of  Senator Patrick Leahy, who intro-
duced legislation on the issue which was adopted into law. Other trans-
national fi gures who supported the cause included Pope John Paul II and 
Princess Diana; Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was later 
enlisted and played an infl uential role in the story’s happy ending:
In the end, the Ottawa process reached agreement on the Convention on the 
Prohibition of  the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, which has now been signed by more than  
countries.
For norm entrepreneurs who are not confi dent of  the support of  British 
royals, world religious leaders, US senators, and foreign ministers of  
important Western countries, this account is not particularly heartening.
This particular description is of  the initial drafting and adoption of  the 
Landmine Convention, but the same point applies to Koh’s descriptions 
of  support for conventions already in force. ‘Transnational legal pro-
cess’ explains how international law norms can come to infl uence deci-
sion-makers, but Koh’s account is too anecdotal to show that the process 
works consistently, or within a reasonable period of  time. The process he 
describes seems most likely to work in cases with suffi cient visibility and 
sex appeal to attract media attention and popular support, and in regard 
to norms that are relatively easy to understand, do not require too much 
sacrifi ce from reluctant domestic publics, and do not touch on fundamen-
tally divisive matters. The process Koh describes is too haphazard to 
 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ , 
at –.
 Koh cites a Washington Post article entitled ‘A Blitz with Glitz: Princess Diana Dazzles a Red 
Cross Benefi t for Land Mine Victims’. Roxanne Roberts, ‘From London, a Blitz with Glitz: Princess 
Diana Dazzles a Red Cross Benefi t for Land Mine Victims’, Washington Post,  June , at D 
(cited in Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ 
,  n  ()).
 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ , 
– ().
 Thus, for example, Koh explains the efforts of  various groups to reverse U.S. policy toward the 
Haitian boat people after an adverse Supreme Court decision left the US in violation of  its inter-
national legal obligations: ‘Various legislative efforts were made to overturn the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, and the issue later became the subject of  domestic political pressure from the African-
American community, the Congressional Black Caucus, and Trans-Africa, all of  whom began to pro-
mote the notion of  a safe haven for Haitian refugees. Finally, in the fall of  , the U.S. government 
changed its Haitian policy, and intervened to return the refugees. When the issue arose again the fol-
lowing year, with regard to fl eeing Cuban refugees, the Administration fi rst resisted, then ultimately 
admitted into the United States those Cuban refugees being detained at offshore refugee camps.’ 
Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’,  Ind LJ , .
 Third World debt relief  seems these days to fall into this category. Internationally famous 
musical acts have put on concerts to raise money and awareness—although apparently they have 
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serve as a general theory of  compliance with international norms in 
 general, or pledges, in particular.
The cynical position appears, at fi rst, to be supported by Hathaway’s 
empirical demonstration that non-signatories and signatories have 
roughly comparable rights records. But Hathaway’s study, while cer-
tainly suggestive, does not purport to examine the question of  interest 
here, which concerns whether compliance is caused by the signing of  a 
treaty or by commitment to the underlying norm. We need to know 
whether there are states that would defy the norm if  it was not embedded 
in a convention but respect the norm once it was legally formalized. The 
cynic challenges the optimist to provide reasons to believe that embed-
ding a moral norm in a legal instrument makes a difference, and as to this 
there is precious little empirical information.
C. Pledges: a Research Agenda
While there is little empirical information about whether it makes a 
differ ence that a moral norm is embedded in a formal legal instrument, 
there are plausible reasons for speculating that it might. These hypoth-
eses about the value of  pledges remain to be tested both analytically and 
empirically. They regard () objective establishment of  consensus; 
() rhetorical support for political battles; and () increased likelihood 
that a judicial forum will be found to enforce the norm in question.
First, and probably most importantly, widespread adoption of  a pledge 
agreement amounts to objective international recognition of  the moral 
values that the pledge embodies. One objective of  formalization of  the 
moral norm in question is that it changes or solidifi es the way we think 
about human rights when we grant them legal recognition. Indeed, 
pledging may be the closest institutional analogy that international legal 
processes have to a petition or referendum. The process of  obtaining 
signatures is democratic in the same sense as the adoption of  General 
not been particularly accepting of  musical talent from the communities whose interests they pur-
port to represent. See, eg Paul Hoskins, ‘Live  Concert will be held in Africa—Geldof’, Reuters, 
 June ; Lars Brandle and Nigel Williamson, ‘Ignored by Live , African acts plan own 
U.K. show’, Reuters,  June ; ‘Live  Concerts Extended to Tokyo, Toronto, Joburg’, 
Reuters,  June ; ‘Destiny’s Child, Linkin Park added to Live  Lineup’, USA Today, 
 June ; Steve McGinty, ‘Bands told “Thanks, but no thanks” by Live ’, The Scotsman, 
 June .
 Koh, importantly, was writing about enforcement of  human rights norms and associated 
humanitarian norms such as bans on landmines—what we have been referring to as ‘rights agree-
ments’. His account of  promulgating and internalizing legal norms works best in the area he set out 
to discuss. Traditional human rights and humanitarian causes are the most glamorous, the simplest 
to understand, the easiest to explain and to convince people of, the ones least likely to require per-
sonal sacrifi ce from the American public—in short, the easiest to market. Rock stars are more likely 
to lend their names to the cause of  canceling Third World debt than to that of  shaming the US into 
paying its UN dues. 
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ  
(). 
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Assembly declarations, which fi lls a somewhat similar function of  object-
ively establishing widespread international support for a particular 
 position. Widespread adoption effectively lays to rest the criticism that 
moral norms are purely subjective, that they are just the idiosyncratic 
opinions of  particular states, or that they are peculiar to particular geo-
graphical regions or cultures. The effects of  such general recognition 
extend even to states that are not signatories.
Second, and partly as a corollary, pledges give those who are willing to 
agitate for recognition and implementation of  the embedded norms a 
degree of  social and legal traction they would not otherwise have. In 
large part because of  such activism, perspectives and arguably even 
behavior are beginning to change. Private parties—increasingly import-
ant as rights activists—gain legitimacy for their critiques and activism. 
Pledges not only secure these parties’ right to claim the moral high 
ground; they also vindicate their claim to represent the public interest by 
providing any objective defi nition of  what the public interest is. ‘Pledge’ 
treaties also provide cover for offi cial agents, both domestic and inter-
national, who face countervailing political pressures.
Finally, although adopting a moral norm into law does not guarantee 
that a forum will be found to enforce it, it defi nitely improves the odds. 
Even a rights agreement that contains no mandatory adjudicative provi-
sion will still be judicially enforceable at the International Court of  
Justice if  there is some other basis for jurisdiction (for example, general 
consent to jurisdiction in advance by the state in question). Rights 
agreements (or other pledges) may be binding in domestic courts. Ad 
hoc criminal courts may be created to enforce them (for instance, the 
criminal courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which applied 
conventional law). Arbitral tribunals or claims commissions are another 
 Note that even General Assembly declarations, which have no binding legal force, are taken as 
authoritative indications of  general opinion; pledges, which are explicitly intended to have binding 
legal force, are at least as authoritative.
 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?’,  Yale LJ ,  
(): ‘Indeed, when a treaty gains a suffi cient following, it is generally viewed as expressing what 
conduct is and is not acceptable to the community of  nations. The treaty can thus infl uence 
 individual countries’ perceptions of  what constitutes acceptable behavior. What is important to 
note . . . is that this infl uence can be felt by countries regardless of  whether they ratify the treaty 
or not.’
 The author thanks Professor Michael Reisman for his helpful comments on this point.
 Art () of  the Statute of  the International Court of  Justice provides: ‘The states parties to 
the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of  the 
Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of  a treaty’. For a case to be brought at the ICJ, it should be kept in mind, 
the complaining party would have to be the state of  which the aggrieved party is a national.
 See, eg Filartiga v Pena-Irala,  Fd  (d Cir. ) (allowing foreign human rights 
victims to sue foreign offi cial in US court under Alien Tort Statute,  USC §  ().
 The ICTY and the ICTR were established by the Security Council in  and , respect-
ively, to deal with the violence in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. They were empowered to 
apply international human rights and humanitarian law, generally. The existence of  the new 
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vehicle for enforcement. Although existence of  a forum cannot be 
taken for granted, these possibilities can arise once a moral norm is 
adopted into law.
None of  these three possibilities can be evaluated in the abstract. In 
assessing them, the questions that need to be studied include:
How frequent and how important is judicial application in the enforce-• 
ment of  pledges?
Do courts require that a moral norm be embedded in conventional • 
form before recognizing it, or do courts have ways to appeal to moral 
norms directly?
To what degree does it matter to foreign policy decision-makers that • 
their refusal to recognize a legal right is idiosyncratic?
To what degree are foreign relations policy makers more strongly • 
infl uenced by a norm embedded in legal instrument than by a moral 
argument?
In mobilizing popular support for a cause (for instance, for fund raising • 
purposes), does the ability to cite conventional law make any difference 
to the population at large?
Undoubtedly there are large numbers of  other questions that must be 
addressed, but these supply some starting points for an investigation. It 
is already clear that pledges raise questions quite different from trad-
itional contractual treaties, and need to be assessed with an eye to their 
particular idiosyncracies.
V .  C
Pledges seem more solid than they really are. They look like treaties, so 
we assume instinctively that signatory states will treat them like treaties. 
But the reciprocity-based incentives that support enforcement of  trad-
itional contractual treaties are not present with pledges, and it cannot be 
taken for granted that states will comply altruistically (or that other 
states, altruistically, will pressure them to comply).
This is not to say that drafting and adopting pledges is a pointless 
activity. Pledges occupy a great deal of  the attention and resources of  
some of  the most important private actors in contemporary international 
International Criminal Court is less relevant here, because it has its own substantive defi nitions of  
international crimes. It is therefore unlikely that it will fi nd itself  enforcing these pledges as a general 
matter.
 One example is the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC), organized under the aus-
pices of  the Permanent Court of  Arbitration in the Hague, which litigates issues relating to the laws 
of  war and international human rights arising out of  the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary war of  –
. See Permanent Court of  Arbitration, Recent and Pending Cases, at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=>. The author of  this article is counsel for the State of  Eritrea before 
the EECC.
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law: non-governmental organizations. It would be a signifi cant mistake to 
conclude too quickly that these organizations do not know their own 
business, namely, the progressive recognition and enforcement of  rights 
agreements. We do not yet fully understand how the process works, or 
how well the process works. Maybe we will never fully understand the 
signifi cance of  pledges, but hopefully some day we will understand them 
at least as well as traditional contractual treaties.
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